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ABSTRACT
BLACK ENTREPRENEURS IN REAL ESTATE
Arthur John Clement
"Submitted to the Department of Architecture on 25 May 1973, in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Architecture
in Advanced Studies."
This thesis is a survey of twelve case studies of Black entrepreneurs
in the business of real estate development. The study documents their
early years of entry into the field, and analyzes their ability to sur-
vive and grow in light of six variables. Individuals and groups involved
were contacted through personal interviews, and the data about their work
compiled into separate case histories.
Results of the study reveal that Black entrepreneurs in real estate
develop primarily multifamily residential units for low and moderate in-
come persons. When in control of the land, they have been able to raise
and borrow equity funds for the initial capitalization of their projects.
In all cases, Black entrepreneurs have also utilized federal assistance
in some aspect of the financial arrangements of their development ventures.
Thesis supervisor: Gary Hack
Title: Assistant Professor, Architecture and Planning
'S
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"If the Negro is to take his place in this western civilization,
it is going to depend very largely upon the way he is prepared. To
graduate from a school of higher learning is one thi ig, but the group
that has been trained to supply that which the world needs and wants,
is the group that is going to survive. In this respect, the Negro un-
fortunately has not succeeded in developing himself to the point where
that which he has to offer is an indispensable asset to his fellow man."
C. C. Spaulding
Former President
North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company
Mechanics & Farmers Bank
Mutual Saving and Loan Association
Durham, North Carolina
C. C. Spaulding, "A Business Man's Conception of History As It Relates
to the Negro," as quoted fromed. Carter G. Woodson, The Journal of Negro
History, (Vol. 25, No:. 4,.October 1940), p. 471.
INTRODUCTION
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RESEARCH METHODS
This study is concerned with the enterprises of Black entrepreneurs
during their early or formative years in the business of land develop-
ment. The purpose of the research was to document the accomplishments
of these individuals into a compendium of case histories for comparable
analysis. The selection of developers was based solely upon the
desire to record a representative sampling of past and present companies
in the real estate development business. A core category of professional
developers was first chosen because of the relevance of their companies
to the study. The group of developers then selected were those indi-
viduals not dependent upon real estate as a livelihood, but who were
nevertheless packaging deals. The next classification decided upon in-
cluded groups or organizations with broadly defined political and eco-
nomic goals, and whose involvement in residential or commercial develop-
ment was justified as an adjunct to their overall program. Historical
examples were chosen to broaden the time horizon of the study, and to
reinforce the idea that Blacks in the business of real estate were not
a current phenomenon. Therefore, the presentation of the case studies
into four categories reflects this selection process.
Each case history was compiled within the context of examining how
the developer performed in six specific areas:
1. Previous background before becoming a developer.
2. Entry into the field, and level of involvement.
3. Attempts to obtain financial backing, either as equity capital
for the company, or as loans for development projects.
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4. Experiences in building a credible track record for attracting
additional investors and packaging new developments.
5. Marketing strategy given the goals of the company.
6. Success in competing in the open market on a comparable footing
with similar types of development companies.
Case histories were obtained by personally visiting each developer,
interviewing the principals of the company, surveying company files
(when permitted) and periodicals for related information, and later in-
specting some of the completed projects. A preliminary report was then
drafted, and returned to the individuals interviewed for any corrections
or additions. A final interview was conducted when supplemental infor-
mation was needed to make complete comparisons on all six points.
-9-
HOW TO READ THIS THESIS
The framework for reading this paper is structured for digestion
in several stages. For those people searching only for the informa-
tional core of the text, the author suggests a cursory glance through
the abstract and conclusions. Readers wishing to skim the thesis in a
short but compact manner should read the main conclusions and each case
study summary. For those attempting to peruse the document in a long
but complete way, it is strongly suggested that the second approach be
complimented with the reading of the twelve case histories. A brief
chronology of important facts is also inserted at the end of each case
for quick review. The outcome however of the reading in all three ap-
proaches should be similar. One should extract from this thesis the
singular thought that Black entrepreneurs, particularly in the develop-
ment of real estate, are beginning to lease inroads into the American
Dream.
-10-
CONCLUSIONS OF THE STUDY
1. Since the 1900's, Black Americans have actively been involved in
the buying, selling and developing of real estate, particularly within
their communities.
2. Black entrepreneurs have entered the field of real estate develop-
ment most often from the construction trades, and secondly from the
realty business (property management, brokerage, etc.) Many have in-
cluded on their staff a construction management capability (sometimes
a general contracting firm) once in the development business.
3. Black entrepreneurs have been able to raise or borrow equity funds
for the initial capitalization of their development projects. However,
they have not been successful in persuading private investors to supply
venture capital to support future development activities of the company.
4. Excluding the historical case studies, every remaining Black developer
has utilized federal assistance in either a direct (grant, or mortgage
subsidy), or indirect (mortgage guarantee) manner for at least one of
their early development projects.
5. Once .a firm contact is established, Black developers repeatedly
used the same financial and lending sources.
6. Black entrepreneurs have built their record of performance by en-
Figures released from the Office of Equal Opportunity for the Calendar
'ear 1972, estimate that Blacks alone received 12.5% of all the total
mortgages insured for sponsors of subsidized multifamily housing, but
only 1% for the total amount of subsidized home mortgages insured.
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larging upon an earlier development strategy. Diversification into other
types of development (large-scale commercial, industrial, or recreational),
or into other regions of the country was non existant in almost all cases.
7. Black developers continue to market their developments toward a
minority clientele. However, there is a noticeable trend toward new
projects involving broader classes of people with higher incomes.
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"If a race through the ages has made no worthwhile contributions
to civilization, its influence is negligible, and its history, such as
it is, is soon forgotten. In a like manner, a race that has achieved
great things, yet fails to preserve its accomplishments by means of a
continuous record, not only loses caste among the races, but leaves no
heritage to guide and inspire the youth of succeeding generations."
C. C. Spaulding
Former President
N'orth Carolina Mutual Life Insurance.Company
Mechanics & Farmers Bank
Mutual Savings and Loan Association
Durham, North Carolina
1 -
C. C. Spaulding, "A Business Man's Conception of History as it Relates
to the Negro," as quoted from ed. ,Carter G. Woodson, The Journal of Negro
History, (Vol. 25, No. 4, October 1940), p. 472.
CASE STUDY: BLACK DEVELOPERS IN THE PAST
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OVERVIEW
This category of cases centers around the exploits of two pioneering
Black entrepreneurs during the early 1900's. The two men, Philip A. Pay-
ton, Jr. of New York City, and Heman E. Perry of Atlanta, Ga., were in-
cluded because their accomplishments within their respective communities
have crystallized patterns of residential development which have subse-
quently affected the location of Black neighborhoods in these two cities.
By studying their operations, as well as the historical milieu of their
times, a more enlightened perspective can be applied to the latter cases
concerning real estate activity among Black people of the United States.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The years between the Civil War Reconstruction and World War I were
a turbulent time in the history of the consciousness of Black people in
this country. It was d.ring this period that the expectation of equal op-
portunity and full citizenship for the recently emancipated Black slaves
became empty and frustrated dreams lost in the rebuilding of the New South.1
By the 1880's and 90's, Southern states had already begun the systematic
disfranchisement of Blacks with the legislation of the Black Code laws,
2
which virtually stripped the Black man of his right to vote. Economically,
the Southern policy of legal segregation was aimed primarily at confining
3
Black workers to a position of cheap, surplus labor. Schools hastily set
up after the Civil War for the "separate but equal" education of Black
children, were now substantially cut in appropriations.
Growing stresses in the living environment of the post reconstruc-
tion of the South, therefore, caused drastic changes in the tactics for
survival within the Black community. Its leaders began to identify
three basic issues that have remained central to the inevitable
-15-
confrontation between Blacks and Whites in America. They were (1) po-
litical and.civil liberties -- namely the right to vote and participate
in the electoral process, (2) economic opportunities -- demands for
free land, fair work and wages, and (3) educational training -- the
5
need for a public school system and higher schools of learning. On
the educational question, Black leaders were unanimously in accord, and
tenaciously fought for the preservation of schools for Black youth. On
the political issues, Blacks were mislead by the promises-of the white
leadership, and were unable to prevent the rapid enforcement of the Black
code laws. On the economic front, Black workers found themselves in
direct competition with labor unions and poor whites, who perceived
themselves as being threatened by free Black laborers seeking similar
employment. The unanswered question concerning the demands for free
land, a fair and natural right since it was the custom to endow freely
emancipated slaves property in other European countries, was never re-
solved here in this country. 6 This major failure by Black leaders to
win such a critical concession as land ownership, was a tremendous set-
back for the great majority of propertyless Black folk.
Denied a voice in the government, and granted a separate school-system
by the mandate of Southern whites, Black leaders were forced to look for
salvation through "knowledge and industry." Appeals were made in the
name of racial unity and solidarity as a mechanism of self-defense.
Goals of industrial education, moral and economic development became
the cornerstone of the belief in a doctrine of self-help. This was
based upon 'the assumption that. through self-effort Blacks could attain
-16-
the "ultimate citizenship rights" accorded to other ethnic groups in
8
the country.
From the 1890's onward, the disfranchised masses of Black people
were urged by their leading spokesmen to look inward and place increas-
ing faith on their own abilities to achieve economic parity. Out of the
political vacuum created by the Southern whites, Blacks began formula-
ting a new creed of "Buy Black," "Double-Duty Dollars," and "Support
Your Own." "At times, emphasis on race pride and solidarity approached
a kind of nationalism..." referring to Black Americans as a nation with-
9
in a nation, a unique and distinct ethnic nationality. Assertive
attitudes of "economic chauvinism" grew in popularity during the 1890's,
and became part of a larger clustering of ethnocentric goals based upon
racial cooperation. Ideas of separate social institutions, such as the
church, the fraternal orders, and even "all Negro Communities" were
espoused and supported. These also accompanied a new interpretation of
race history, the cultural heritage of Blacks in this country, and their
11
ties back to ancient African civilization.
Aspirations were cast upon the growth of an employer class of "Black
Capitalists," who would operate business enterprises that would employ
as well as service members of the Black Community. A clear expression
of such a growing trend of thought was recorded at the Fourth Atlanta.
University Conference in 1899, which devoted its entire meeting to "The
12
Negro. -in Business. The keynote address was given by Prof. John Hope
of the Atlanta Baptist College (presently Morehouse College), who de-
13
livered a paper on ".The meaning of Business." In his speech, Prof.-Hope
-17-
called upon Black workers to save their earnings; hold on to it, and
then rise above the insecurity of a laborer by becoming self-employed.
He explained that jobs for Black men and women would now have to be
created "from Negro sources." As an ethnic group, Blacks must learn to
survive and prosper while living among the "so called Anglo-Saxons...a
conquering people, where business is.. .the power motive.. .and the raw
material of their civilization." To neglect the world of business, to
remain out of touch with the industrial and merchantile spirit of this
age, Prof. Hope concludes, ". .. would be suicide to the Negro." 1 4
The conference ended with the adoption of numerous resolutions, the
general content of which implored the Black masses, and "the better clas-
ses of thinkiig Negrces," to cocper ate with and patronize the business
establishments run by members of their own race.15 Thus, the concep-
tual formulations of the Atlanta University Conference for a business
ethic to be applied throughout the everyday lives of Black Americans,
r.eceived a favorable endorsement from the outstanding educators and
businessmen of the South.1 6
Actual implementation of the Conference's resolutions through the prac-
tice of a racially based economy started with the formation of the National
Jegro Business League (NNBL) in 1900 by Booker T. Washington, its founder
and first president. Beginning with his famous Atlanta Exposition Address
in 1895, and continuing until his death in 1915, Washington was the most
powerful figure for anything affecting Black affairs in this country.
lHe advocated the minimization of tensions between Blacks and Whites, es-
pecially in the South, to harmonize the -mutual interests and progress
-18-
18
of both races. He encouraged his race to engage in agriculture, com-
merce and the service professions; to learn the skills and knowledge
19
for the everyday occupations needed in thier lives. Washington's
economic viewpoints were a corollary to this main doctrine. Emphasis
was placed upon the value of, and need for, earnest labor, capital
accumulation, and the careful management of money. Additionally, he
personally admonished his people to purchase land and to build their
20
own homes. In the context of Negro thinking of the period, perhaps
the most significant force of Washington's philosophy was his clear
expression of the racial ideals of self-help, group solidarity, moral
character, frugality, and wealth.2 1
A rational extension of the Washington Ideology was the develop-
ment of a separate economy operated exclusively for and by Blacks in
this country. His approval of the doctrine of "race enterprises" was
borne out in his formation of the NNBL, to support and encourage the
22
growth of Black owned businesses. The birth of the League (which
still exists today) "gave emphatic proof of his belief in at least the
necessity of trying to develop...racial businesses."2 3
The ideology of "Negro support for Negro busines'ses had been grow-
ing since the 1870's.24 There were numerous factors encouraging the
spread and acceptance of this concept. For'emost was the decline of the
Black worker as a skilled craftsmen during the later years of Reconstruc-
tion. These enterprising artisans who catered to white customers were
gradually losing their dominance of the skilled trades of shoemaking,
-19-
tailoring, printing, barbering, butchering; as machinists, black smiths,
25
caterers, and as owners of popular eating and drinking establishments.
Many were either replaced by white merchants or forced out of business
by the ordinances of the Black Code laws. What later emerged from this
occupational shift was a new class of Black entrepreneurs who were de-
26
pendant upon the patronage of their race for their livelihood. Con-
sequently, the real burgeoning of Black businesses after 1890, and es-
pecially after 1900, represented both the retrenchment of one group of
skilled enterprisers, and the development of a new breed of business
and professional men who were now locked-onto a segregated class of
27
people.
The formation of Black owned businesses flourished during the years
between 1895 - 1930. Based upon a study conducted by Dr. W.E.B. DuBois,
the number of Black enterprises grew from 1,900 in 1898 to 70,000 in
28
1930. This period also witnessed the founding of all the major Black
29
controlled financial institutions in existence today. The bulk of the
new businesses, however, were in the field of personal services -- res-
taurants, beauty parlors, barber shops, funeral homes, and "Mom and Pop"
30
grocery stores. These "defensive enterprises" were the direct result
31
of the inverse effects of racial segregation. But many such businesses
begun within this period were ruined during the Depression years of the
early thirties. The aggregate number of surviving businesses
continuted to decline in later years, and was not turned upward until the
decade of the sixties when the demands for community control and economic
development qnce again sprang forth from the hearts and souls of the Black
-20-
population.
HISTORICAL APPRAISAL
The financial posture of racial economics has been critically attack-
ed by business historians of later years. M.S. Stuart writes, "perhaps
because he (Washington) realized the formidable difficulties involved
in persuading white America to accept a broader commercial policy for
the Negro," Washington was nevertheless assuming "the Negro can ac-
complish that which under similar circumstances, no other group has
achieved -- a successful but isolated 'race business' by the side'of,
32
and in competition with the general business (economy) of the nation."
Race business concludes Stuart, "that is exclusively owned by and ca-
ters to only members of a particular group...is a policy in conflict
with the fundamental logic of commerce, of trade, which thrives the
33
mnore by expansion and suffers under constriction." Stuart labels
thoughts of racial isolation as "cruel mockeries... in racial experi-
mentation," expecting the Black man, "admittedly the weakest of all
American groups, economically naked just three-quarters of a century
ago,...to rear a stepchild economy, without the protection of any dis-
34
tinct political autonomy." Stuart ends his criticism by posing the
question: why must the Afrikan dragged over to this continent be driven
into a solitary corner, and then coerced to embark along an "Economic
Detour" which no other ethnic group in the history of this country. has
35been required to travel?
Writing at a similar time, James B. Mitchell offered his comments
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on the 'inadequacy of an all-Black market.6 Black owned business suffers
in particular "from the handicaps of its strictly racial market," from
the meagerness of accumulated capital among its customers and from the
37
"economic exclusion which directly affects their investment opportunities."
Moreover, for the Black businessman, his own community "is not his ex-
clusively to exploit." Large scale, multi-billion dollar enterprises
have few if any obstacles of entry, and conduct their particular busi-
38
ness freely and at will within the Black community. Unfortunately.
the reverse has not been true. Unable to shelter or regulate his own
"domestic" economy, Black businessmen have not reciprocated by crossing
over and penetrating the larger and more lucrative markets of white
America.
Historian August Meier points to three basic shortcomings to the
race economy concept. A "truly seqregated economy," Meier writes, was
impossible for Black Americans when (1) the basic industrial and credit
facilities still remained in the control of whites, (2) the majority of
the Black workers were in the employ of white industrialist, and (3)
Black entrepreneurs were unable to capture even a small proportion of the
Black market when forced to compete against other firms within the con-
39
straints of white America's political and legal systems.
It is difficult to pass final judgment on the effects of Booker T.
Washington's economic ideology. His peculiar mixture of ethnic solidar-
ity, political complacency, and economic immobility was a functional stra-
tegy for survival for the period of history in which it was designed.
In more recent years, the legacy of Washington's thought has become em-
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bodied in a more militant political posture, and again, coupled with a
plea for economic nationalism. But, both ideologies continue to confine
and stereotype economic development for Black Americans. It is a men-
tality which in effect places blinders on the purview of Black business-
men, narrowing their exposure to other geographical markets, and shack-
ling their growth to a lame duck economy.
In the current world of international trade and worldwide markets,
Black owned enterprises can no longer be measured against themselves,
nor can specialized businesses thrive by catering exclusively to segre-
gated markets. Consequently, it is paradoxical that the rationale which
gave existence to the early development of Black owned businesses years
ago, today threatens their economic well-being for the years to come.
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ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORICAL CASES
Philip A. Payton, Jr. is generally credited as the one individual
most responsible for the opening-up of Harlem to Black Americans in the
first decade of this century. As an enterprising realtor, he was astute
enough to envision the need for a readily available supply of housing
for New York City's expanding Black population. Primarily through his
persistent efforts and without any previous experience, Payton persuaded
white realty owners and landlords to let him manage their properties for
the sole purpose of filling the buildings with Black tenants. Through
this approach, Payton "fathered and engineered" the first major influx
of Blacks into Harlem.
In Atlanta, Ga., Heman E. Perry is likewise remembered for initiat-
ing the development of a new residential neighborhooa during the early
1920's which has since grown into a stable Black community of numerous
subdivisions. He originated the movement to the West side of the city
through the establishment of a combination of business enterprises that
offerred life insurance protection, bank financing, and homeownership
to the Black residents of Atlanta. Perry's achievements were lasting
in that he left behind both the blueprint and the foundation for Black
controlled financial institutions to carry forth his bold and pioneering
spirit of service enterprises for Blacks.
Entry into the Field: In both cases, the driving force of each organi-
zation was the enterprising dreams of one individual. Philip Payton was
an educated man who first learned about real estate while working as a
janitor in a white realty company. He immediately seized the potential
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of beginning a similar operation for himself, and later opened his own
realty office. Heman Perry also gained valuable business training as
an insurance agent for two white insurance companies in Texas. It was
not until he had established his own .company, Standard Life, that he
saw the need to branch out into real estate.
Track Record: Payton began his career strictly as a property manager.
Acting as the rental agent, he would lease the apartments for five years
from white landlords, and begin filling the vacant units with Black ten-
ants. As the demand for available housing increased, more and more
Blacks began migrating into Harlem where occupancy was obtainable. To
counter white neighborhood opposition, Payton was forced to begin pur-
chasing the apartments to guarantee that Blacks would not be evicted.
Perry began buying property on the Westside of Atlanta around 1917. In-
itially, he was selling individual parcels on a sporadic basis. But,
following the sale of a large tract of land to the City of Atlanta,
Perry began subdividing the lots, promoting homeownership, and the ser-
vices of his companies to finance and build the houses.
Financial Backing: When performing as just a managing agent, Payton had
little need for large sums of money. But, when he began purchasing
apartment houses on a bigger scale, he had to form a partnership and
later incorporate the company. Payton was assisted enormously by the
backing he received in raising equity capital. He had among his inves-
tors some of the most promenient and wealthy members.of the New York
Black community. As protegees of Booker T. Washington, they were in
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accord philosophically on the reason for the Afro-American Realty Com-
pany. Unfortunately, many withdrew their support when the company later
became embroilled in legal and financial problems. Perry first raised
the capital for his insurance company, Standard Life; from this financial
base came the funding for the remaining Service Companies. In reality,
Perry was only re-circulating the same cash flow that Standard Life
brought in from insurance premiums. When the Service Companies began
investing heavily in underdeveloped real estate, essentially a frozen
asset, Standard Life similarly became non-liquid. To remain solvent,
the company was forced to dig deeper into its legal reserves normally
set aside for coverage of its insured policies.
Marketing: in both cases, each business was servicing only one residen-
tial market. This was based in part by their philosophy which stressed
cooperative ventures for racial as well as economic development. But,
by defining their market domain so narrowly, both Payton and Perry cor-
respondingly reduced the investment opportunities for their companies.
Unconsciously, they locked-out new investors. Both enterprises also
suffered from a complete dependency upon the earning potential of a
particular market segment. Payton felt the sharp decline in his rent-
rolls when the recession of 1907-08 depressed the wages of Black workers
(for those who were not put out of work). Perry's combination of com-
panies was also subject to the fluctuations in the incomes of the Black
working class who struggled with the little money they had to pay their
weekly premiums or mortgage notes.
Open Market: Neither company catered to the broadest market possible.
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Payton concentrated on Harlem, and Perry on the Westside. In .the pro-
cess of overcoming strong white opposition, Payton had few resources
left to expand outside of Harlem. Perry, perhaps, possessed the poten-
tial for competing on a competitive level in the real estate market at
large. All the financial and building services were located within the
scope of his operations. Consequently his organization of total-develop-
ment services was precocious for its time, but inadequately restricted
by the meager resources of a racial sub-economy.
Summary: Afro-American Realty Company and the Standard Life Service
Companies were not the first or last of the major real estate operations
conducted by Black Americans during this period of. history. Their sig-
nificance, however, is that they embodied directly the popularly held
concepts of racial cooperation and economic self-help. Their valient
attempts to build a financial base within a geographically circumscribed
market proved to be economically impractical.
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PHILIP A. PATTON, JR.
AFRO-AMERICAN REALTY COMPANY (AARC)
NEW YORK CITY
Harlem Residential Market before 1900's
During the early years of the twentieth century, numerous northern
cities were witnessing the rapid expansion and re-settlement of their
Black populations. The resulting demographic shifts produced strong
hostilities on the part of most white residents, causing buildings oc-
cupied by Blacks to be bombed in Chicago and Cleveland, and a race riot
in Sprinfield, Illinois. The origins of all Black segregated communi-
ties in northern cities was perhaps best exemplified by the takeover of
Harlem by Black Americans.
The creation of such a large racially-segregated neighborhood with-
in one large and well-defined geographical area was a unique occurance
in New York City's history. Prior to the 1900's, Blacks living in the
City were restricted to small residential sections dispersed across Man-
hattan Island. These communities were only a few blocks in length, and
were juxtaposed among neighborhoods of white working class families. 2
In the 1890's, Harlem was a predominantly white residential section~
3
located far uptown. The main source of transportation was the recently
built elevated train running along Eighth Avenue. With the announcement
to build another line up to Harlem via Lenox Avenue, a real estate boom
swept that -part of the city. This new wave of building activity was
spurred by real estate speculators'anticipating the appreciation of prop-
erty values after the completion of the new subway route. All vacant,
unimproved or underdeveloped land untouched by the first wave of specu-
-28-
4lation in Harlem during the 1870's was now being built over.
Property speculation had the dangerous effect of inflating the
price of land and the cost of constructing homes (rowhouses) out of
proportion to their actual monetary value. Real estate operators were
frantically buying and reselling buildings for prices beyond what the
gross income of the tenement houses justified. The common attitude, in
the early 1900's was only the urge to get rich quickly by trading Har-
lem properties.5
The inevitable collapse of Harlem's building boom came in 1904-
1905. Overbuilding had filled Harlem with apartments, many with high
vacancies, particularly east of Lenox Avenue. Market values had been
artifically inflated for too long, which in turn produced rents ($35-
$45 per month) too high for the general population. With many rent
rolls shrunk by expensive vacancies, the frequency of mortgage fore-
closures prompted financial institutions by 1905 to stop making loans
6
to Harlem speculators and building and loan companies.
Concurrently, between 1890 and 1900, Blacks throughout Manhattan
were in search of better living conditions. In midtown Manhattan, the
construction of the Pennsylvania Station had touched off the commercial
expansion of that area of New York City. These events lead to the dis-
location of many Black neighborhoods, whose residents were forced to
seek decent accommodations uptown in Harlem. Landlords there were plagued
with unoccupied tenement houses, and welcomed any tenants they could get.
Furthermore, these modern rowhouses in Harlem offered Blacks housing far
superior to anything they had ever engaged or lived in while in New York.
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These dwellings could house several families, thereby serving the pur-
pose of apartment houses.7 Consequently the imbalanced nature of Har-
lem's housing market presented the unique opportunity whereby astute
real estate agents could capitalize on a 'soft' real estate market
by steering large numbers of Black folks toward Harlem.
Philip A. Payton, Jr.
Philip Payton was born in Westfield, -ss. in 1876, the son of a
barber. He was educated in the South, graduating from Livingstone Col-
lege in Salisbury, North Carolina in 1898. A year later he came to New
York City and worked several odd jobs (handyman, porter, and barber) a
pattern typical of many other Black businessmen of this generation who
were forced to accept menial service jobs in the early years of their
8
career. Later, as a janitor in a white real estate office, Payton
first became exposed to the world of housing and real estate speculation.
Brash and confident at the youthful age of 24 years, he began his own
business, specializing in the management of tenements occupied by Blacks.
For nearly a year he was unsuccessful before he convinced a disgruntled
landlord to let him manage and fill his empty house with Black tenants.
Payton was immediately successful in this endeavor, and afterward in-
duced several other landlords to follow suit.
By late 1904, Payton had incorporated his business, and was con-
sidered.withi-n his community as the leading real estate agent. He was
an ambitio-us and impetuous man, a hard-driving salesman exuding confi-
9
dence and bubbling with enthusiasm. His early exploits made him rich
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almost overnight and he closed business deals involving large sums of
10
money before he had accumulated much practical experience.
His business career was punctuated by the vicious cycles of the
New York economy in general and the feast or famine fluctuations of the
local real estate market. He reached his lowest point in 1908 with
the collapse of his Afro-American Realty Company, and soared to his big-
gest triumph in 1917, one month before his death, when he and several
associates bought six elevator apartment houses -- the ultimate in lux-
ury apartment house construction -- catering exclusively to "...refined
11
colored tenants...."
Payton and the business circle to which he belonged were all mem-
bers of Booker T. Washington's National Negro Business League, and were
tremendously influenced by his economic teachings. As one of the lead-
ing minds behind the organization of AARC, Payton would often explain
the ultimate goals of his company by calling upon other members of his
race to follow his example and pool together their financial resources
in order to obtain decent housing for themselves. He would express
grave concern that often Blacks hesitated to patronize competent pro-
12
fessionals of their own race. James Weldon Johnson, a-peer of Payton's
generation, later wrote that Payton's overriding ambition was to make
available the best housing in New York (and later Harlem) for his people.1 3
Payton was convinced that the best approach for improving housing con-
ditions for Blacks was through the industrious involvement of Black
real estate agents, and not through the graces of "disinterested white
14
landlords.." Even when confronted with the fact that white homeowners
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in Harlem and the local white press were organizing to prevent further
15
Black penetration, Payton was resolute in pursuing his goal of open-
ing tenement houses block by block for his race.
Afro-American Realty Company -- Its history
Payton organized a partnership of ten Black businessmen in 1902 to
acquire five year leases of white-owned property in Harlem, and then
manage the building for Black occupancy. Early success in obtaining leases,
opened up housing near Fifth Avenue. As more Blacks moved in, the colony
began spreading westward, block by block, across Lenox Avenue. White
residents of the area became alarmed, and attempted to halt the advance
of Black settlement. They formulated plans to check the "invasion" by
creating a dummy corporation, the Hudson Realty Company, in which they in-
vested their resources. Next they bought up properties that housed
16
Blacks and evicted them. Payton countered this action by the purchase
of tenements located on the same block, to rent to Black Americans.
To raise additional capital, Payton then reorganized his partner-
ship into a re-al estate corporation, the Afro-American Realty Company. It
was legally incorporated (1904) in the city of New York to buy, sell,
lease, and rent properties and/or buildings. "It was capitalized at
$5000,000, and authorized to issue 50,000 shares at $10 a share. Ten
of the eleven original members of the all-Black Board of Directors sub-
scribed to 500 shares each. The company began with an estimated capital
of $100,000.17 The result of Payton's organized opposition enabled more
Blacks moving uptown to penetrate still -further into Harlem.
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The steady and increasing influx of Afro-Americans pushed across
Lenox Avenue and on beyond to Seventh Avenue. This created a new out-
break of white resistance resulting in the formation of the "Harlem
Property Owner's Improvement Corporation" for the purpose of preven-
18
ting Blacks from coming into Harlem to live. They apparently brought.
pressure on white financial institutions not to refinance mortgages on
19
properties occupied by Blacks. The repercussions of this move es-
tablished a precedent that has plagued Black homeowners ever since.
When many whites began leaving and selling their homes at prices far
below the properties' assessed value, many banks and lending companies
holding mortgages on these deserted houses were compelled to take them
over rather than rent or sell them to incoming Black people.2 The
withholding of large amounts of debt capital, created unjustifiable
hardships among Black owned realty companies and other Black property
owners.
The Black community reacted by launching campaigns of their own.
Prompted by the appeals of the Black press and churches, decisive action
took shape in the formation of "crusading companies" organized "to ac-
quire property, dispossess whites, and rent to members of their own
race."121
The Afro-American Realty Company was the largest and most widely
known of these newly launched companies. The business venture started
with sound financial backing, and its board of directors and investors
included local entrepreneurs, eminent leaders and politicians of the
Black community in New York City. The group included, amont 'others:
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Charles W. Anderson, leading Black Republican politician
in the city, and presidentially appointed (Theodore Roose-
velt) collector of Internal Revenue in New York.
J. Thomas Fortune, editor of New York Age, oldest, and most
influential Negro newspaper in New York. (For some time his
paper advertised appeals for stock investment into the AARC.)
James C. Thomas, first president of AARC was considered one
of the wealthiest Black businessmen in New York.
Fred Moore, general manager of NNBL, became editor of New
York Age when Booker T. Washington bought controlling in-
terest in the paper in 1907.
Wilfred H. Smith, one of the most esteemed Black lawyers
in New York during this period, an attorney for AARC; an
intimate of Booker T. Washington, who later severed con-
nections with the company and was .influential in bringing
suit against Payton for fraud and misrepresentation.
Emmett J. Scott, investor in AARC and secretary to Booker
T. Washington.
Through his association and membership in the New York branch of
the National Negro Business League (NNBL) founded by Booker T. Washing-
ton in 1900), Payton became a disciple of Washington's business phil-
osophy. The two men corresponded regularly, Payton sending periodic
reports of the .corporation's progress, and Washington maintaining friend-
ly ties with the officers of AARC.
Under the original company structure Payton was vice-president and
general manager. Nevertheless, he wielded the real power, and controlled
the day-to-day operation of the corporation. Early company transactions
were profitable and gave credence to the existence of AARC. By the end
of 1904, AARC had acquired and completely filled five, four story flats,
and had five year leases on eleven other buildings. A year later, the
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Realty Company owned six tenement houses and had fourteen leased.2 2
To attract more financial support, Payton advertised regularly in
the Black press, soliciting investors among the Black working class, and
23
hired a salesman to sell company stock. Payton continued a policy of
aggressive speculation based upon his optimistic business judgment. By
early 1906, Payton had leased or purchased with loans or mortgage some
25 houses, located primarily in Harlem, that represented an estimated
value of $1.1 million based upon an annual rental income of $114,500.24
However, many of the directors of the company strongly disagreed
with Payton's policies as general manager. The internal dissension
erupted in October of 1906 when disgruntled stockholders sued Payton and
the Realty Company for exaggerating and falsifying the corporation's fi-
25
nancial prospectus. The outcome of the suit was that specific charges
of fraud involving Payton were dismissed and the Company itself found
guilty of misrepresentation by claiming it owned unencumbered property
26
when in fact all of its houses were fully mortgaged.
A final reorganization of AARC left Payton as president and general
manager. The company continued to do business through 1907 despite the
bad press it had received in the civil suit case. In order to restore
confidence in the company's name, the first and only dividend was issued
in June of 1907. Payton continued to buy property at a rapid rate, and
disavowed any advice for a more moderate policy of acquisition. His
bullish attitude did not hold true, .and the recession of 1907-08 caught
the Realty Company rich in assets but poor in cash. Payton could not
raise enough money to pay his mortgage and interest payments to remain
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solvent. The company collapsed when Booker T. Washington rejected
a desperate proposal for him to underwrite the company's note due 1 Jan-
uary 1908. All of its mortgages were foreclosed and AARC lost con-
trol of all its properties.
The Legacy
As a financial corporation, AARC never survived to see the lasting
accomplishments of its early work. Instead, it succumbed to four years
of internal dissension, three major reorganizations of its Board of Di-
rectors and officers and a highly publicized court battle. But through
the determination of its promoters, AARC "spearheaded the growth of Black
28
Harlem." The company was a pioneer and vanguard in securing homes for
Afro-Americans into sections of New York previously unavailable to Black
tenants. Payton and his backers initiated a wave of real estate buying
among Harlem's new Black community that lasted well beyond World War I.
By the 1920's, practically every major Black institution had moved from
its downtown (mid-town Manhattan) quarters to Harlem.29 Even when AARC
had to dispose of its properties, the new owners continued to cater to-
30
ward incoming Black tenants. Furthermore, after its collapse, other
Black organizations sprang onto the scene to pick up the fallen mantle
31
of AARC..
The groundwork for the establishment of the largest Black community
in the early decades of the twentieth century- was built through the ef-
forts of the AARC, and was ca.rried forward 'y the help of .other Black
realty companies. ..Therefore, the lion's share of the credit for opening
up decent housing for Blacks in New York must rest with the individuals
of the Black community.-
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PHILIP A. PAYTON, JR.
AFRO-AMERICAN REALTY COMPANY, INC.
NEW YORK CITY
Chronology
1900 -- Payton opened his own business
1902 -- Payton organized partnership of Black Businessmen
1904 -- Payton reorganized partnership in a real estate corpora-
tion -- Afro-American Realty Company, Inc.
1906 -- Civil suit brought against Payton and Afro-American
Realty Company by stockholders for misrepresentation
1907 -- First and last dividend of Corporation declared
1908 -- Economic recession in the city; collapse and bankruptcy
of Realty Company
1917 -- Payton and his associates purchase six luxury apartments;
deal concludes business and personal lift of Philip Payton.
-37-
HEMAN E. PERRY
THE SERVICE COMPANIES
ATLANTA, GEORGIA
In 1908, Heman E. Perry astounded the Black business community of
Atlanta and of Georgia with the announcement of his plans to organize
the first Black-owned "old line legal reserve," ordinary life insurance
company. The apparent reason for the amazement was that such an in-
surance company required an initial stock capitalization of $100,000.2
Mlost insurance enterprises organized by Blacks at that time were gen-
erally cooperative ventures for group protection that grew out of church
relief, mutual aid and benefit societies, fraternal orders, and provi-
dent or assessment associations. They usually offerred burial insur-
ance, sick and accident claims, plus assistance to widows and orphans
of deceased members. But no group of Black businessmen had ever gotten
together before to begin a straight ordinary life insurance company to
gamble against the high mortality expectations of the Black population.
The large white insurance companies discriminated by either charging
exorbitant premiums, or by refusing to insure Blacks completely. Thus,
the impact of Perry's intentions was tremendous. 3
lie was partially successful in raising the equity capital, launching
two successive campaigns over a three -year period in which he raised
$70,000 worth of stock. A note was secured for the balance he lacked
($30,000), and the Standard Life Insurance Company of Georgia opened
4
for business on 22 March 1913. The company started operations in the
Big Bethel AME Church building located on Auburn Avenue, which at the
5
time was the main business street in the Black community.
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Heman Perry -- The Man
6
Perry was born in Houston, Texas, on 5 March 1873. He completed
the sixth grade in the city's public schools, and afterwards left to.
7
start working as a cotton sampler. After numerous other jobs in be-
tween Perry served as an agent for two white insurance companies in
Texas, learning about the business during his employment.8
Why he left Texas and moved to Atlanta is not known. Perhaps he
shrewdly recognized that Atlanta with its stable and active Black com-
9
munity was rapidly becoming the "Black Mecca of the South." For what-
ever reasons, Perry came onto the Atlanta scene in the early 1900's,
and created several institutions whose very existence had a lasting in-
fluence on the growth and prosperity of Atlanta's Black community.
Perry envisioned and had a constructive part in the development
of the Standard Life Insurance Company in 1913, the Service Companies
in 1917, the Citizens Trust Company in 1921, and the Penny Savings Bank
in Augusta, Georgia."10 'Perry believed that the control of wealth was
the road to economic independence, the solution to the Negro's problem.
The ultimate objective of his companies was to harness the resources
of the Negro, so that a wealth of capital could be put to use wherever
11
and whenever needed." Perry later created and organized various af-
filiated financial schemes, most- of them subsidiary enterprises of
Standard Life. They were collectively referred, to as the Service Com-
panies:
Service Realty Company
Service Engineering and Construction Company
Service Printing Cofnpany
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Service Pharmacy, Inc.
Service Farm Bureau
Service Foundation, Inc.
Service Laundry
Citizens Trust Company
It was Perry's dream to promote business enterprises filled with young
and talented business leaders. His approach to the economic development
was to recruit educated men and women in colleges and universities across
the nation, and persuade them to put their newly trained skills to work
in his business enterprises. One of his favorite maneuvers was to
visit or communicate with a young Black in school, offer him a job, then
go to his home town and sell him a life insurance policy with the argu-
ment that now he (or she) was gainfully employed, it would be sensible
protect his future and its economic potential (in terms of future
earnings) 13
Undoubtedly, Heman Perry was a man ahead of his time. Those who re-
member him, or knew people who had worked in the employ of one of his
businesses have only positive remembrances and fervent words of admira-
tion for the man personally. He was characterized as an individual of
unusual perception and of unselfish service, who knew what he wanted to
14
do and how he was going after it. By nature, he was a "genius," a
dynamic and creative person; but a "slave to caprice and novelty, im-
patient of routine, and prone to shun the drudgery of detail. He was
entirely unfit for any role in business save that of promotion and sales-
15 16
manship (in which he was top-notch)." Perry was a "prolific reader"
who. nourished his fertile mind with the "conception of plans and schemes
that on the surface appeared feasible and profitable, .but if were pur-
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sued with diligent persistance might have worked out successfully." 1 7
Despite the later failure of Standard Life, "Perry was not dishonest
for any selfish purposes, and there is much to indicate that he cared
little for personal pleasures or luxuries. He devoted nearly all the
salary of $800 per month he received as president of Standard Life to
the financing of other schemes. He never owned an automobile, did not
gamble or drink, never married or succumbed to the least dissipation or
social extravagance." In fact, Perry had to be often persuaded by his
close associates to buy "presentable wearing apparel."18
After his resignation from Standard Life in 1923, Perry went to
St. Louis, Missouri, in a "feeble attempt to rehabilitate and revive the
Mid-West Life Insurance Co." He later died in Kansas City in 1928, des-
perately trying to interest investors in his latest business scheme.
Nonetheless, the results from Heman Perry's dreams and manipulations
rests on three major accomplishments. First, he sold the stock
necessary to receive a state charter for the creation of the Citizens
Trust Company in 1921. Until his departure two years later, Perry served
20
as chairman of the board. Consequently, his founding efforts launched
the growth of one of the largest Black controlled banking institutions
in this country.
Perry's second notable achievement was the formation of the now
defunct Service Realty Company which acquired property and developed new
21
homes for Blacks in the Westside of Atlanta. His pioneering ef-
forts of creating a new residential subdivision for Blacks has expanded
and continued unabated until the present. The entire Westside today is
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now a stable neighborhood of detached homes and apartment complexes that
are owned and occupied by Blacks of all incomes.
Perry's last contribution was his recruitment and in-house train-
ing of numerous young businessmen who later went on to higher careers
with other companies, having got their initial start in at least one
22
of Perry's enterprises. They include among others:
L.D. Milton, Past President of Citizens Trust Company
Harry Pace, Former President of the Supreme Liberty Life
Insurance Company in Chicago
J.B. Blayton, Past President of Mutual Federal Savings and
Loan Association in Atlanta
C. R. Yates, Owner of a drugstore chain in Atlanta; his
first store, Gate City Drug, was fumerly Service Phar-
macy, Inc. and was bought by Yates when the Services
Companies failed
Standard Life -- The Collapse
Unfortunately, Standard Life never began its operations on solid
financial backing. Perry had fallen short of the required stock capi-
talization of $1000,000 as stated by Georgia law, and was never success-
ful in eliminating the deficit, or adequately maintaining the mandatory
legal reserve limits essential to a life insurance company.
In 1922, just prior to the time when Standard's financial difficul-
ties came to public notice, the annual statement showed over $28 million
of life insurance in force, and assets totaling $2, 042,439.18. Of this
amount, $936,268.85 or approximately 45% was in mortgage loans and real
23
estate. -$305,172.35 or about 15% was reported as being in cash. The
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large holdings in mortgages and cash were a direct result of Standard's
affiliation with its Service Company subsidiaries, including the newly
opened bank. The insurance company had made a large deposit in Citi-
zens Trust, who had in turn invested heavily in the financing of the
operations of Service Realty Company.24
By the end of the following year the financial situation of Stan-
dard Life worsened. The annual statement as of December 31, 1923, re-
vealed the following:2 5
mortgage loans $840,845.43
cash 880,977.83
bonds 215,043.02
Of the $840,000 in cash, over $700,000 was deposited in the subsidiary
26bank of Citizens Trust. The $700,000 in cash had been "largely loaned
by the bank to Service Realty Co. which had invested the capital into
vacant properties on the Westside of Atlanta where Blacks were beginning
to move. Citizens Trust, having loaned its money out to Service Realty,
was then short of ready cash to meet its own clearings." Therefore,
Standard was forced to keep its cash reserves in the bank so it could
remain open, and to keep intact on Standard's balance sheet a "doubtful
and completely frozen asset of.$840,000" (whose real value was essentially
27
non-income producing real estate.)
Just prior to the December statement, Standard had to. double its
stock capitalization from $125,000 -- $250,000.' The new stock issue
was financed accordingly. Service Realty used the collateral of its
assets (equity in land investments, plus the personal endorsement of its
officersJ which in reality was money the bank had originally loaned the
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the company to underwrite the new equity financing in Standard. The
amount of $335,000 was then credited to Standard Life's cash deposit in
Citizens Trust as the purchase price of the stock.28 Consequently,
Standard Life could not draw on its account for fear of closing the
bank, and the bank could not collect on its note to Service Realty un-
29
til the company liquidated its property and paid for the new stock.
Essentially, the whole process was a paper transaction, which served
to inflate the assets of Standard, and was made feasible only by the
interlocking directorships. Heman Perry and his staff at the insurance
company were almost exclusively the officers to Citizens Trust, Service
30
Realty, and the other subsidiaries.
To inject some sorely needed capital, Perry secured a loan from the
President of the Southern Insurance Co. of Nashville, Tenn., in the name
of the Service Holding Company. The face value of the loan, $550,000
was exchanged for a majority block of stock in Standard, as well as an
additional mortgage covering all of the combined assets of the Service
31
Companies (mainly Service Realty).
Upon an audit by the Georgia Insurance Commissioner and the state
Banking Dept., Standard Life was ordered to divest itself from its sub-
sidiaries. Citizens Trust was directed to separate from the insurance
company, the insurance company from the Service Companies, and the Ser-
32
vice Company from the bank. By the end of 1924, Standard Life had
ceased affiliation with Citizens Trust, and the Service Company was now
only a stockholder of the bank. The resulting reorganization reduced the
33bank',: assets by one half (from. $1,500,000 -- $725,000).
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-However, the financial crisis became more acute for the insurance
company. Perry was forced to relinquish his control of the failing
Standard in June of 1923. The company was later reinsured by Southern
Insurance Co. -- the majority stockholder at that time -- and conver-
ted in 1925 to the Standard Life Insurance Company of Arkansas. Con-
trol rested there until the Black-owned National Benefit Life Insurance
Co. in Washington, D.C. bought what was left of the business. Standard,
unfortunately, was "milked" on each successive re-organization of the
34
company's ownership.
The entire affair culminated in litigation with a large number of
persons and corporations involved. In the major legal battle, Charles
i. Brown, et al, vs. Standard Life Insurance Company, the "courts tried
to put an end to the numerous cases being litigated, as well as provide
35
for the administrating of Standard's affairs." Court evidence re-
vealed that "... the deficiency in the legal reserve required, far ex-
ceeds the amount of the capital stock...," and that the company "...
had sustained losses of property and funds to such an extent that it
does not now have the amount of assets which the law requires as a re-
serve for the protection of the policyholders."3 6
The final death blow came in 1931, when the National Benefit Life'
ceased operations. Part of its decline was directly attributable to
its reinsuring of the debt-ridden Standard Life. 3 7
Service Realty Company
The Service Company started. in 1917 with an authorized capitaliza-
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tion of $100,000.38 From this base, Perry launched most of his service
enterprises. However, the largest and most active was the Service Real-
ty Company. One of Perry's first ventures was the purchase of twenty
acres of vacant land in the Westside across Ashby Street. He later
sold ten acres to the Atlanta Board of Education who were in need of a
site for its second all-Black high school. Perry not only made a pro-
fit on the transaction (of $20,000), but he successfully obtained the
contract to build the school through his Service Engineering and Con-
39
struction Company. This was in part influenced by the fact that the
construction company had earlier built the first all-Black high school
40
for the city.
Inspired by- his early successes, Perry continued to purchase ad-
ditional vacant land, subdividing the acreage into smaller lots,and
then constructing 1omes on them. The Citizens Trust Company was created
to assist in the financing of these homes. "The original prospectus of
the bank stated: Citizens Trust Company would lend funds for the build-
41ing of homes from the reserves which the insurance company had built up."
But, contrary to Perry's future plans of the insurance company be-
coming the capital feeder to his subsidiary ventures, Standard overexten-
ded its assets and became insolvent in 1924. Service Realty was most
affected by the failure, because its assets were tied up as stock in
Standard Life. When Perry resigned all interests in the insurance com-
pany, he also lost all title to the properties owned by Service Realty.
The Legacy
Perry's goal of financing a service industry of businesses to work
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collaterally did not succeed. The diversity of enterprises required
too many different skills and administrative back-up. Perry was not
.equiped with enough trained personnel who knew what they were doing in
42
each of the numerous ventures. He compounded the problem by contin-
uing to spread himself, his manpower, and his capital too thinly. Con-
sequently, Perry's companies eventually sufferred from poor business
decisions, from a lack of technical stuff, and from a dependency upon
one financial source of capital.
In the case of Standard Life, Perry overextended the financial re-
sources of the company, and involved Standard in a maze of entangling
transactions that inflated its real worth, but later precipitated a
liquidity problem. Perry's biggest setback was his inability to raise
large sums of capital from outside sources.
Judged by his own aspirations, "Perry lived and died a martyr of
his wild zeal to build a combination of Negro financial enterprises of
"43favorable comparison with any in America." But, he nevertheless left
a blueprint for how a tandem of companies could work together in future
operations.
Following in Perry's footsteps, though more successfully, three in-
dependently controlled, but Black owned financial institutions emerged
to pick up the fallen mantle of Standard Life and the Service Companies.
The Atlanta Life Insurance Company, the Mutual Federal Savings & Loan
Association, and the Citizens Trust Bank (formerly Citizens Trust Com-
pany) have furthered the expansion of Black families into residential
subdivisions on the Westside of Atlanta. Their combined-.ef.forts from
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1940 onward has supported the establishment of home-buying in the
Hunter Road development, the Mozley Park area, in Collier Heights, and
44
Crestwood Forest, the Bankhead area, and the Edgewood section. Thus,
even today, Atlanta's.Black community is widely known for its traditional
45pride in homeownership. The bold, pioneering spirit of Heman Perry
continues on into the nineteen seventies.
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HEMAN E. PERRY
THE SERVICE COMPANIES
ATLANTA, GEORGIA
Chronology
1908 -- Perry announced plans to organize a legal reserve in-
surance company
1913 -- Standard Life Insurance Company began business as a
legal reserve company, the fruition of Perry's plans.
1917 -- The Service Companies were formed.
1921 -- Citizens Trust Company was chartered.
1923 -- Perry is forced to resign as President and Chairman of
the Board Of Standard Life, the Service Realty Company,
and the Citizens Trust Company.
1923 -- Perry died in Kansas City, Missouri.
1931 -- Standard Life, now a part of the National Benefit Life
Insurance Company; both collapse.
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CASE STUDY: PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPERS
-57-
ANALYSIS
The case studies compiled for this chapter -- professional develo-
pers -- reflects Black enterpreneurs at their best. Developers such as:
Larry Smith of United Community Development, Inc.
H. M. Michaux, Sr., of Union Insurance and Realty Company.
John W. Winters of John W. Winters & Co.
Herman J. Russell of H. J. Russell Companies
Denis A. Blackett of Housing Innovations, Inc.
all of whom are examined in this chapter, form an unusual group of re-
sourceful businessmen. The case histories of their companies are note-
worthy in that singular respect. Each study which traces the penetra-
tion of their company into the real estate industry essentially becomes
a testament to the extraordinary achievements of each of these indivi-
duals.
These enterprising Black men are categorized as professional de-
velopers (and builders) for several reasons. One, land development is
the largest source of revenue derived from their business activities.
Two, as entrepreneurially inclined persons (who thrive on taking risks,
surmounting obstacles, and getting things done), these men "live" from
one business deal to the next. Three, all are financially secure,' self-
made men, who have built land development companies that have survived
in the industry for five years or more.
Entry into the Field: In four of the five cases studied, each entre-
preneur entered the real estate business via another occupation. With
the exception of Michaux, who began as a real estate agent immediately
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following college, the remaining group of developers started their pro-
fessional careers in other jobs. Before moving into development, Smith
was a general contractor, Winters a skycap, Russell a plasterer, and
Blackett an architect planner. Furthermore, the transitional shift in
prefessions was not done abruptly. Smith began as a consultant to non-
profit groups in the packaging of federally insured housing projects.
Winters first built his own home, and then started building others; but he
retained his job as an air porter during the early years. Russell
began buying properties and constructing duplexes early in his career
although plastering was his principal trade. Blackett got involved in
implementing unique and experimental housing programs for the inner city
on a non-profit basis. Michaux spent his early years working for an-
other real estate company before forming his own firm. He also increased
his real estate acumen by first specializing in property management.
Financial Backing: Several routes were tried by these men as inexperienced
developers attempting to begin their first independent project. Smith
invested most of his time and energies as a housing consultant, relying
upon the 100% mortgage guarantee of the government to close out the trans-
action. B1ckett began with the solicitation of private donations and
grants to begin a pilot housing program. He later revised his program
to include agencies funded from government sources. Blackett was ex-
tremely successful in persuading private financial institutions to com-
mit funds for the completion of his projects. Michaux started when
governmental assistance was unheard of; consequently, he had to seek
private lenders. As he pointed out, during the twenties and thirties,
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"it was difficult to borrow as well as pay back." Following the New
Deal legislation of Franklin Roosevelt, Michaux was able to obtain
FHA insured loans for Black homeowners. Winters also utilized FHA loans
during the fifties when he began building homes. His problem was find-
ing a suitable mortgagee to accept the loan. During the sixties, Rus-
sell relied extensively upon recently enacted federally subsidized pro-
grams to finance his housing construction. In fact, he has been as suc-
cessful as any developer in the country in obtaining federally guanan-
teed mortgage money.
Track Record: In the critical area of performance and the ability of
getting projects completed, a few trends are noticeable. All of the
developers began on a modest scale. Michaux and Russell started build-
ing and managing duplexes. Blackett first rehabilitated old homes and
later switched to new construction on scattered sites. Smith began
packaging turnkey rehabilitation projects for the local housing author-
ity, and Winters build only ten homes in his first few years of oper-
ations.
Once gaining a toehold in the market and familiarity with financial
sources, most developers have either diversified away from a dependency
upon federal housing subsidies for low and moderate income markets, or
they have expanded the scope and size of early developments. Both Blac-
kett and Smith are branching into new construction in suburban or high-
ly desirable urban locations. In recent years, Winters has built more
apartment units than homes to even-out the cyclical nature of home build-
ing. Michaux-has guided his company from the simple tract building
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of duplexes and homes to the broader scaled planned unit developments.
Russell, having stock-piled mortgage commitments under Section 221(d) (3)
moved to other federal programs which are in vogue such as 221(d) (4) or
Title Seven under the New Communities legislation.
To continue the momentum once a series of projects have been com-
pleted, added capital becomes mandatory for future investments. As over-
head and staff increases, new projects must be started so that earnings
will continue to increase. With the exception of Blackett, no other de-
veloper studied in the case histories has successfully attracted a sub-
stantial investment of private funds from institutional sources. Blac-
kett closely allied himself with John Hancock, a major insurance
company, who in turn, reciprocated with a $400,000 equity investment
in his company. This amount excludes other commitments and arrangements
negotiated between the two parties during their association. Russell,
the biggest developer in the group, has diversified significantly to
the point where he needs only to reinvest in new projects to keep his af-
filiated businesses actiVe, Winters and Michaux have utilized local in-
vestors for years. Smith's financial backing for the future is not
known.
Marketing: On the supply side of marketing, few major problems have
been encountered in recent years. With the help of government guaran-
tees and mortgage subsidies, Black entrepreneurs have been able to make
housing developments a profitable venture within the Black community.
They have been able to attract investors because depression losses in-
sured by the government within the inner city are as equally redeemable
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as depreciation losses incurred in the suburbs. On the demand side, de-
cent housing is still sorely needed for the low, moderate, and upper in-
come markets within the Black community. Consequently, any new housing
that comes onto the market is easily absorbed. Problems come later with
tenant management and building maintenance.
Open Market: Russell, Blackett and Smith definitely have demonstrated
their entrepreneurial abilities to compete in the open market. Russell
has built luxury apartments in upper income white neighborhoods of At-
lanta. Blackett and Smith are presently involved in projects with ten-
tative commitments to build outside of the geographical limits of the
Black community. Winters during his early years had the opportunity
to build homes for white families, but declined to expand further than
his present market. Michaux has never attempted to build for other ra-
cial groups up to now; however, he has passed his knowledge and contacts
on to his sons who are presently becoming established to market sophis-
ticated complexes to the public at large.
Summary: A few conclusions can be stated about the five developers
studied in this chapter.
1. The awkward transition into new development was often accom-
plished by straddling several jobs at once. Each developer at some
critical juncture, had to overlap the security and income of another job
to his venturing out into real estate. -The. developer remained perched in-
between several professional roles until he received a firm commit-
ment to finance his project. This occupational shift caught:
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Smith as a contractor, consultant, and developer.
Blackett as a planner, administrative director, fund raiser, and
developer.
Michaux as a managing agent, broker, and then an owner of property
units.
Winters as a skycap, contractor, and realty agent.
Russell as a plasterer, contractor, and local proprietor.
The juggling act of spreading personal resources among several jobs is
frequently necessary until the entrepreneur can survive solely upon
the income derived from the properties he develops. Without sufficient
equity capital before entering the field, all the developers studied
had to negotiate this occupational shift.
2. Once having completed several development projects that
gives creedence to their existence, most developers have
tried to enlarge upon whatever factors or projects allowed them to pene-
trate that market initailly. For Blackett it was the Boston Infill Hous-
ing; for Russell federally insured apartment construction; for Smith it
was being a financial consultant to development related projects for
non-profit or community groups; for Michaux it was property management;
and for Winters it was subdivisions for Black homeowners.
3. When a financial lending source was contacted, and a working
relationship established, these sources were used time and time again.
In the case of Blackett, he relied upon John Hancock and the Massachusetts
Housing Finance Agency. Russell built a pipeline to the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Smith has utilized private mortgage
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bankers; Michaux and Winters have capitalized on the presence of Black
controlled lending institutions as mortgagees for FHA insured home loans
or as permanent lenders for conventioanl loans.
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UNITED COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, INC. (UCD)
84 STATE STREET
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02109
LAWRENCE R. SMITH, PRESIDENT
In the early sixties, Lawrence Smith was a subcontrac-
tor doing mostly site work, excavation and the like with the
anticipation of eventually moving into general contracting.
He soon realized that he was in a vulnerable position as
a subcontractor downstream from the developer who ultimately
had the final word on any financial aspect of the project.
Seeking, more control over the production of his work,
he therefore decided to get out of the contracting business,
and move up to development himself.
His conversion in 1965 occurred before real estate de-
velopment (particularly residential) became a fashionable en-
deavor encouraged by federally subsidized programs . With readily
available mortgage commitments many amateurish non-profit community groups
got into housing. The result of governmental sponsorship of housing for
low and moderate income families, Mr. Smith feels, has affected both sides
of the street, precipitating opportuniteis for both blacks
and whites to move into residential development.. In fact,
many neophyte community groups are still around as a conse-
quence of the easy access to federally guaranteed mortgage
money during the late sixties.
Mr. Smith never envisioned being restricted solely to
the minority communities when he first entered the market as
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a developer. He later found however that it takes time to
acquire the necessary capital and proper financial contacts
to initiate conventionally financed projects. Realizing that
it would take awhile to build up a track record of housing
projects, Mr. Smith's mode of approach in the early years of
"getting to know his way around" was to go the non-profit
route, obtaining 100% mortgages from HUD, and then settling
for a consultant's fee. This approach allowed him the luxury
of living through a housing development package from "front
to back," and to observe the consequences of his input with-
out assuming personal liability as a conventional developer.
ie was thus able to accumulate invaluable experience while
avoiding the exposure of any major and personal losses.
As a housing consultant, Mr. Smith has worked with the
following non-profit groups:
Immanuel Apartments, Roxbury, in conjunction with
Immanuel Pentecostal Church.
Pychon Apartments, Springfield, Mass. (under con-
struction)
Roxbury Comprehensive Community Health Center, placed
interim financing with L.M. Primack, mortgage bankers
and the permanent loan with New England Mutual Life In-
surance Co. (the clinic is under construction).
In the planning stages:
Eliot Part Apartments with Eliot Congregational
Church.
Concord Towers, with Concord Baptist Church.
Mr. Smith has also consulted with Community Development Cor-
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porations under the auspices of OEO on community sponsored
residential and commercial developments:
Hough Area Development Corporation, Cleveland,
Ohio.
The Woodlawn Organization, Chicago, Illinois.
Mr. Smith's apprenticeship program attuned him to the
complexities of building inner city housing. Any attempts
of improving the quality of life for low-income families in
the core city meant controlling the management of the hous-
ing project., providing security for the tenants, and of main-
taining a low density. He was expecially critical of putting
too many large families with young kids into a single housing
development. Instead, Mr. Smith advocates packaging a balan-
ced socio-economic mix of tenants for most multi-family hous-
ing projects, and for each section of the city as well.
Today, UCD specializes in FHA mortgages, diversifying
its projects with either limited dividend or conventional fi-
nancing. Having accumulated several years of on-the-job
exp eriences and a track record of completed housing projects,
Mr. Smith feels that he now has access to financial backers,
and the confidence of lenders whereby he can now aggr-essively
negotiate new real estate ventures.
In retrospect, Mr. Smith is of the opinion that the sub-
sidy and non-profit programs now affected by the federal mor-
atorium will never resemble the free handouts given during
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the sixties; more and more real estate development will be
conventionally financed.
UCD has just completed the restoration (gutting the
insides of the building to the bare walls and floors) of 25
rowhouses in Boston. The $3.3 million project includes 136
apartments to be purchased by the Boston Housing Authority
under its turnkey rehabilitation program, who will then manage
and rent out the units to low income persons. UCD has worked
closely for over two years with the People's Elected Renewal
Committee, the Emergency Tenants Council, and the South End
Tenants Council to acquire and develop- the 25 buildings com-
prising one side of an entire city block. Construction finan-
cing was provided by L. M. Primack of Boston and CBT Realty
Corp. of Harttord, Conn. Because of the active participation
of local community groups, the valuable location of the prop-
erty (in one of the most central streets in the South End of
Boston), and the scope of the project (an entire city block),
Mr. Smith feels that quality and success of the turnkey apart-
ments is almost guaranteed.
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UNITED COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, INC.
84 STATE STREET
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02109
LAWRENCE R. SMITH, PRESIDENT
Chronology
Early 1960's
1965 -- 1969
1969 --
Sub-contractor
Switched over to development end of the
business; consulted on non-profit, fed-
erally guanarteed (100% mortgage) hous-
ing projects.
UCD formed; strictly limited dividend
and conventionally financed projects.
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UNION INSURANCE AND REALTY CO.
2515 APEX HIGHWAY
DURHAM, N.C. 27707
H. M. MICHAUX, SR., PRESIDENT
H. M. Michaux first entered the real estate business in
the fall of 1921 when he accepted employment in the Black-
owned and operated real estate agency of McDougall, Merrick
& Wilson. He had just completed his educational training at
North Carolina Normal Training School in Durham, N.C., and at the
time had no previous intention of ever selling real estate, al-
though he had worked odd jobs to pay his way through school.
Deciding to accept steady employment in Durham also meant that
he would not return to his family (and thirteen brothers and
sisters) in the western hills of North Carolina.
The Black community of Durham was unusual for a city of
that size.. Economically, 3lacks owned a successful insurance
company, a commercial bank, and a savings and loan associa-
tion. The businessmen and directora of these prosperous fi-
nancial institutions believed deeply in "doing something for
themselves and for their people," recalls Michaux. They
were men who "had something above the average," and who open-
ly encouraged young people to stay in Durham and "make a place
fo'r themselves."
Taking up the challenge, Michaux worked for over a year
as a real estate agent, and then opened his own office, Mich-
aux and Company, so that he could buy and sell property for
-70-
himself. But by 1925, he decided to merge his efforts again
with McDougall, Merrick & Wilson, this time reorganizing both
firms under a new company, Union Insurance & Realty Company.
Union specialized in property management, collecting rents,
and maintenance. Michaux also continued in his capacity as
an agent selling fire insurance for the local Black-owned
Bankers Fire Insurance Company.
Surviving the Depression, Union did not move into new
construction until the late thirties. Michaux then organiaed
a construction company (supervised by a graduate of Tuskegee
Institute), and began building homes on undeveloped tracts
of land within the city limits. In a three year period,
Union built and sold over thirty homes to Black residents in
the city. The houses were insured by FHA, and financed through
the local savings and loan association. Numerous rental units,
such as duplexes and fourplexes, were also contructred during
this period.
After the second World War, Union continued its services
in property management and fire insurance. The company had
built up a comfortable volume of rental income producing prop-
erty. No new constrnction was pursued.
In 1956, Michaux was able to purchase, through contacts
and connections he had accumulated while in the business, a 267
unit apartment complex in. Raleigh, North Carolina (the State
Capitol 23 miles southeast of Du4rham). It was a federally
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financed project constructed six years earlier for $1.27
million. The original owner was subject to a windfall, and
was anxious to sell the project. Michaux felt he was of-
fered the project because of his experience in property manage-
ment, and because the apartments were occupied exclusively
by Blacks. He closed out the deal with a $52,000 purchase
money mortgage.
During the mid-sixties, Michaux was joined by his two
sons, H. M. Jr. and Eric, both of whom are lawyers -- one a
state representative in the N. C. General Assembly. Their
active participati-on in the operation of the Company has
been instrumental in guiding Union back into the field of
new development. Raising additional capital among several
individual investors, the sons have purchased (with a land
mortgage and a cash downpayment) over one hundred acres of
prime real estate in the southern tip of Durham. The parcel
of land is a short five minute drive from the Research Tri-
angle, a 4,500 acre industrial park sponsored by the State
-fNorh arolina which hiscqcts the tri-city area of Durham,
Raleigh, and Chapel Hill. Plans are being prepared to con-
struct a Planned Unit Developme.ht (PUD) of 300 apartments,
approximately 50 homesites (for sale) and a commerical con-
venience center. The multi-family complex will feature both
townhouses and garden 'apartments consisting of two to four
bedroom with one and a half to two and a half baths.
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The rental range is skewed toward middle and upper income
families, with the townhouses available for optional con-
version to condominium ownership. The proposed PUD is geared
toward the growing white collar market employed in the Re-
search Triangle Park, and the expanding middle income popu-
lation that is moving southward away from the downtown area.
Mortgage commitments have been obtained from FHA and a major
insurance company.
Forced to relocate by the Urban Renewal Authority, as
were numerous other Black businesses from the main commer-
cial and institutional district of the Black community, Union
has built a two story 14,000 sq. ft. office building on a
corner site in its new suburban location in the southern end
of the city. Adjacent to this property is proposed a regional shop-
ping center of approximately 600,000 square feet of gross rentable
space. A lease commitment with a full-time department
store as the anchor tenant is currently being sought.
Reflecting upon his career,.Michaux seems untouched b-y
his reednt successes. Now an elderly man, he does not pro-
ject the forceful determination and "rugged individualism"
that carried him through the lean years. He politely stated
that he was fortunate to have made it through the depression
years, to have continually kept Union's doors open serving
the community and never failing to pay his employees. In the
early years, with no business training or preparation, he had
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to learn through trial and error, utilizing the meager re-
sources that were at hand. Union has been "practically a
one-man operation," declares Michaux, an "uphill journey"
for 48 years.
Over the years, he has been urging and preaching the
ownership of property among "his people." He supported on a
national level the founding of the National Association of
Real Estate Brokers in 1947, and is presently a board mem-
ber of that association. Locally, Michaux has stimulated and
trained Blacks about the intricacies of real estate and the
demands of property management. He also feels strongly
that the Black homeownership market is finally growing. The
income of Black adults is raising, based upon better job
opportunities; in turn, they are demanding more affluent
neighborhoods in which to live.
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UNION INSURANCE AND REALTY CO.
2515 APEX HIGHWAY
DURHAM, N.C. 27707
H. M. MICHAUX, SR., PRESIDENT
Chronology
1921
1925
1938-40
1956
1960's
1971
Michaux enters real estate firm of McDougall, Merrick
and Wilson.
Union Insurance and Realty Co. is formed
Union builds and sells some thirty homes to Black families
Union purchases large apartment complex in Raleigh, N.C.
Michaux is joined by his two sons
Union erects new office building
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JOHN W. WINTERS & COMPANY
507 EAST MARTIN STREET
RALEIGH, N.C. 27601
JOHN W. WINTERS, SR., PRESIDENT
John Winters attributes his success and established
reputation as a developer of subdivisions and apartments to
two overriding attitudes that were fostered early in life.
The first has been his unyielding desire to create and build.
He feels strongly that this gift was inherited from his
mothe.r and blessed with divine guidance. Winters explained
in the following manner: his grandfather, Oscar Winters
a free born Black man, bought a tract of land in 1852 just
outside of the town of Raleigh. Oscar's daughter-in-law,
the mother of John Winters, later saw the value of retain-
ing ownership of part of the land so that money might be
derived from the rental income produced by the property
and structures on it. From her, Winters states, he first
recognized his latent talents for designing and building homes.
The second principle which has shaped Winters' life is
his philosophy about managing money. His goal, set early in
his career, was to amass capital by economizing his style
of living, setting aside on a regular basis extra income from
the numerous jobs he has always held; then investing his
savings into worthwhile aativities such as homebuilding and
plowing the profits back into the business.
Although he is hesitant to pinpoint any particular set
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of circumstances which help to explain why he has been able
to push further and achieve more than some of his contempo-
raries, Winters feels that such an explanation is totally
inadequate when attempting to communicate how and why certain
opportunities or breaks came his way. He only speaks repea-
tedly about the above two forces that have, in a small way,
undergirded his life.
During his early years, Winters generally hustled at two to
three jobs, working eighteen of the twenty-four hours in the
day. He has experienced such menial jobs as shining shoes,
cleaning washrooms in the County Fair, scrubbing floors as
a janitor, feeding chickens, delivering milk and carrying
bags as an airport porter. With a growing family to support
Winters was unable to locate a single job with a salary large
enough to live on, and accumulate a "nest egg" as well.
But the urge to build something began pulling away at
his attention so much so that Winters decided to begin con-
structing his own house in the late forties. Buying lumber
and materials from a large building supply company in Ra-
leigh owned by Cliff Benson, whom Winters got to know while
as a skycap at the airport. he eventually completed his home
in 1950.
The idea gradually occurred to him about the tremendous
opportunity to build homes for Black people because no one
was directly serving them during those years. The white con-
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tractors at the time had plenty of business and would not be
bothered with the black market "cross town. " They merely
assumed, which was true, that mortgage financing would be a
serious problem and as a result few Black families were able
to build homes in the early fifties. Winters began thinking
about the possibilities of setting himself up as a general
contractor in the home-building field -- where he would buy
the land, prepare the architectural plans, hire subcontrac-
tors, build the home, landscape the grounds, and then sell
the finished product.
Winters approached Benson again, this time asking the
supplier to provide him with the materials for another house
on credit, based exclusively upon his demonstrated ability
to finish and pay for the materials for his own house. Ben-
son agreed to advance the building supplies and take back a
first mortgage on the house to be built, but only upon Win-
ters' proof of ownership to the land free and clear. Later,
Benson was instrumental in assisting Winters in putting to-
gether a work crew.
S-ince he was building the house on speculation -- with-
out a d.efinite buyer in mind, Winters
had to 'locate both a potential homeowner .and a mortgage com-
mitment. Fortunately, a couple-just moving into Raleigh be-
came interested in the house. After numerous refusals, a
mortgage was finally secured through the Black-owned Mechanics
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& Farmers Bank. To obtain the permanent loan, Winters di-
rectly approached the bank's president whom he met previous-
ly while as a skycap at the airport. The financial com-
mitment allowed Winters the break he needed. Benson was -re-
paid, and Winters emerged from the transaction with a pro-
fit for his enterprising efforts. The money was promptly
invested in another vacant parcel of land, on which he be-
gan work on his second house. Repeating the success of his
first sale, Winters placed the mortgage again with Mechanics
and Farmers Bank. The surplus proceeds were turned over in-
to still a third house which was built and sold by the end
of 1957. The following year, seven more homes were put on-
to the market in the same fashion.
Despite his big plunge into homebuilding, Winters con-
tinued his job as skycap at the airport. Up until 1959, he
would begin his day with his construction crew at 7 A.M. to
supervise the work. After a full day there, he would go to
the airport, arriving about 4:30 P.M. and work another seven
hours until midnight. By maintaining both jobs, Winters did
not have to rely solely on his homebuilding to survive. Av-
eraging $50-60 a day in tips alone, he did not need to uti-
lize immediately the earnings from his homebuilding; he sim-.
ply reinvested his profits into more homes, more real estate.
Winters started his first .ubdivision in 1959 on twelve
acres of vacant land about a' mile from downtown Raleigh.
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Since this was the largest development he had yet to under-
take, Winters encountered difficulty obtaining financing for
the cost of the raw land and its development. He eventually
received a ten-percent down first mortgage on the land plus a
second mortgage to install the streets and utilities. Ben-
son was more than happy to advance him the materials since
John W. Winters & Co. had now become a large purchaser of
building materials. The finished development -- forty-one
homes on one-third acre lots in a $20,000'- $30,000 price*
range -- quickly sold out.
Winters later organized a real estate agency when he was
asked to become the broker for a 350-home subdivision just
built on the suburban fringe of Raleigh. The development
was assembled by a white group who wanted Winters to handle
the sales. He received a commission on each house sold plus
any fire, casualty and liability insurance the occupant might
wish to buy.
Since that time, John W. Winters & Co. has built more
apartment complexes, and fewer single family detached homes.
The steady rental income from the apartments Winters owns
help to even out the home building slumps. By 1970, the
Company had put in place over 400 residential dwelling units.
Presently; Winters ha.s also begun speculating in undeveloped
real estate, forming land trusts and selling out later to
builders.when the property had appre-ciated in value.
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Perhaps surprisingly Winters has never constructed new
housing under the federally subsidized programs used by many
minority developers during the sixties. The concept of sub-
sidies -- "handouts" -- is not congruent with his social
ethic. He would prefer to help those personally who are com-
mitted to improving themselves, such as negotiating special
arrangements for homeowners who are short on their downpay-
ment. In actual cases, Winters has agreed to delay his pro-
fit on the sale of the house so that the homeowner can close
out with an adequate mortgage. For example, on a $22,000
home, a bank normally extends a $18,000 mortgage. If the
buyer can only make a downpayment of $2,000, the balance of
$2,000 will be loaned on the credit. of Winters, put into
a savings account, and released to him with accumulated in-
terest when the amount was paid down by the mortgager. In
that manner, numerous homeowners unable to make the entire
downpayment were then able to purchase their homes without
the burden of a high interest-bearing second mortgage.
Today, Winters has reassembled the exact property owned
by his grandfather, downtown, and has built on it his own
office build-ing. Abutting the main corner is an additional
two-story (12,000 sq. ft.) office building.
When speaking about the investment potentials of real
estate, Winters continues to emphasize the business atti-
tudes which have guided hini .through his successes. He talks
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about the keys to an independent financial position, the
necessity of carefully managing of money, and the importance
of setting aside capital strictly for future investments.
Winters asserts that real estate developers make use of
their experience and knowledge just as any other corporation
would value its ability to make money for its stockholders.
But, in order to attract the confidence of investors, the
developer must first establish an excellent bank credit re-
ference. This is done by accumulating a record of repaying fi-
national obligations, so that in future loans, he can enlarge
~the line of credit issued by the bank. Additionally,
Winters feels that a developer should strive to redistri-
bute his income back into his operation to increase his fi-
nancial control and equity participation in future develop-
ments.
Winters is a strong advocate of doing business with
the entire general public, with or without Black patronage.
Customers are essentially interested in quality, and when
they are spending "first class money" it does not soothe
their consciences when Black-built or Black-owned does not
measure up to the best available on the market. Therefore,
Winters admonishes against building a business dependent just
upon the Black community or any othor minority group. Instead,
he recommends establishing a service or product that meets
the needs of the largest possible sector of' people.
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JOHN W. WINTERS & COMPANY
507 EAST MARTIN STREET
RALEIGH, N.C. 27601
JOHN W. WINTERS, SR., PRESIDENT
Chronology
1950 -Winters builds his own home.
1957 Three additional houses are built
1958 Seven more homes are built
1959 Winters begins his first subdivision
1963 Becomes brokering agent for 350 home subdivision
1970 Winters & Co. has built over 400 residential units
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HERMAN J. RUSSELL
504 FAIR STREET S.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30313
One of the foremost plastering contractors and housing developers
in Atlanta, Georgia, today is Herman Russell. The forty-three year old
businessman oversees a $40 million complex which employs approximately
500 persons, and which operates in sixteen cities throughout four south-
eastern states. Widely regarded as the most successful business figure
in Atlanta's preeminent Black community, Russell is either an "owner or
partner in fifteen different firms."2 He has both a plastering and dry
wall company, a construction company that specializes in building apart-
ments, a rental and management agency, and a land investment firm.3 Rus-
stll is the proprietor of a grocerette and a liquor store, is a partner
in two nursing homes, and publishes a weekly newspaper, the Atlanta In-
4quirer which he helped start in the early sixties. He is a principal
in the new town of Shenandoah planned outside of metropolitan Atlanta,
which recently was awarded a HUD conditional guarantee of $40 million.5
In other enterprises, Russell is vice chairman and largest stockholder
in the Citizens Trust Bank of Atlanta (assets $38 million); he is one of
the participating owners of the Omni Group which holds the franchises
for the Atlanta Hawks (professional basketball), the Atlanta Flames (pro
6
hiockey), and a new soccer team.
Russcll grew up in the Atlanta ghetto of Summerhill and attended the
city's public schools. Before going on to college, Russell accumulated
work experience in his father's small plastering company (becoming a
journeyman plasterer) and in the construction of duplex houses. While
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still in high school, Russell saved enough money to purchase his first
plot of land for $250 near his home. He later paid his way through
Tuskegee Institute in Alabama, working his trade in conjunction with
his studies, and graduated in 1953 with a diploma in building construc-
8
tion. Returning to Atlanta, Russell began working out of his father's
basement as a plastering subcontractor, doing three or four small jobs
daily. He bought a "rag-tag" pickup truck for $150 to get himself and
his helper about town. Four years later, Russell was employing 25 men,
building new homes, bidding on apartment plastering contracts, and pur-
chasing more property. He later inherited his father's business when
9the elder Russell retired in 1957.
Inspired by his father's legacy, Russell began expanding his volume
of work into a multi-million dollar operation by landing larger commer-
cial and federal subcontracts. During the mid-sixties, H.J. Russell
Plastering Company did the plastering, fire- and dry-wall work on such
miajor structures as the Atlanta Stadium (which was a former urban re-
newal site in Summerihill), and the 34-story Equitable Building in down-
10
town Atlanta. - In 1961, he began work on his first of 24 federally
guaranteed housing projects by building a $3 million 210 unit complex
for Wheat Street Baptist Church (the largest Black Church in Atlanta).
Along the way, Russell began acquiring small lots and building du-
plexes to rent out (many of which he still owns today). His construc-
tion company, separate from the plastering firm began building apartment
complexes all over Atlanta in the early sixties. Utilizing federal mort-
gage money, and Atlanta's booming housing market, Russell's company-built
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luxury apartments in the white areas on the Northside, and low and
moderate income units in the Black neighborhoods on the Westside. H.J.
12Russell Construction Co. has built more than 1200 units, and those
which Russell is at least a 50% owner are handled by his own rental and
13
management company. At present, Russell now conducts most of his real
estate transactions through his own realty company.
The most ambitious and successful housing project undertaken by
Russell to date, is the 424-unit, $7 million federal 221(d)(4),luxury
14townhouse development. Known as the Pace Setter Apartments, the com-
plex is located in the predominantly Black, middle class Collier Heights
suburb of northwest Atlanta. Pace Setter features such amenities as
two Olympic-sized -pools, a plush club house, child care, and the choice
of six spacious floor plans.15 The two story townhouses themselves ri-
val any luxury rental complex in metro Atlanta, and at lower prices.
Rents charged begin at $162 for a one-bedroom flat, and go up to $225
for three-bedrooms. "Russell says some 200 families already live there,
of which about 10% are white." 16
Russell's track record in housing has been nothing short of being
sensational. Although he has built several conventionally financed
developments, the bulk of his rental housing has been 221(d) (3) federal
17
projects. It is reported that Russell and his partners have been
18
awarded some $35 million in federal mortgage money. Russell's claims
to being a political independent have nevertheless enabled him to main-
tain a pipeline to federal contracts and housing programs during both
19the Johnson and Nixon administrations. The current eighteen-month
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moratorium on certain federally subsidized housing programs is not ex-
pected to have a major impact on his operations because of the number
of projects that were processed and approved just before the freeze
went into effect.
In February of this year, the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment (HUD) announced the approval of its fifteenth (and second
largest amount ever) new town guarantee.20 The $40 million commit-
ment is slated to help finance the land development of Shenandoah, a
complete new towr projected eventually to house 70,000 persons. The
7,200 acre site is located along Interstate 85, about 35 miles south
of Atlanta in Coweta County, Georgia. When completed over a twenty
year period, Shenandoah will represent a capital investment in excess
of one billion dollars. The developer of Shenandoah is Long Acre
Development, Inc. of Atlanta, of which the partners are Scott Hudgens,
Herman Russell, and Unionamerica, Inc., a Los Angeles based bank holding
company which recently purchased Scott Hudgens Realty and Mortgage Co.,
21
Inc. of Atlanta.
For Russell, Shenandoah presents the rare opportunity to create
an urban environment that is "more than just a new town.' Shenandoah
has the potential of becoming a society where social, racial -and eco-
nomic integration is a reality; a society where all kinds of people can
live and work together. "It will be a new town like nothing else in
the Southeast," states Russell. Family groups from all income levels
will be dispersed throughout the clustering of eleven neighborhood ac-
tivity centers, each complete with schools, parks and playgrounds, com-
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munity facilities and neighborhood shopping. Russell's optimism and
excitement underscores the true motivation of the new town -- to pro-
vide a full range of educational, occupational, cultural and recrea-
22
tional opportunities for people of all incomes.
"There is no doubt in my mind that Shenandoah will be an oppor-
tunity for the rural citizen to pull himslef up by the bootstraps with a
job,an education, and a house." Russell believes that it is the unequal
access to jobs, education and shelter that is the crux of today's.so-
cial ills. Consequently, Russell appreciates the fact that he is now
in the unique position to contribute, through his success, to the solu-
tions of problems dividing people in the society.2 3
"I'd like to think that kids look up to me and say, 'Now there's
a guy who came out of a hard core area. He's not as smart as I am. If,
he can make it, so can I.' -People like myself have an obligation to
help others pull themselves up, too. Just because a person is born with
some b.ad breaks is no reason to give up on life. Everybody has a pro-
duct to give, if he is given a chance to cultivate what he has." 2 4
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HERMAN J. RUSSELL
504 FAIR STREET S.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30313
Chronology
1953 Russell graduates from Tuskegee Institute, major in building con-
struction. Returns to Atlanta, becomes a plastering contractor.
1957 Father retires; Russell takes charge of his plastering business
1961 Builds first federally insured housing project -- 210 unit.
1966 Builds commercial center (556 Fair Street) retail and profes-
sional office space.
1972 Completes Pace Setter Apartments, 424 unit complex
1973 Partner in the new community of Shenandoah; received HUD guaran-
tee of $40 million.
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HOUSING INNOVATIONS, INC. (HII)
50 FRANKLIN STREET
BOSTON, MASS. 02110
DENIS A. BLACKETT, PRESIDENT
Following joint experiences as an urban designer and planner for
Lhe Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) and as a director of the Urban
Planning Aid, an advocacy planning organization, Denis Blackett decided
to chart a new path in his career by accepting the position of joint
director of the Roxbury Development Corporation (RDC) and the New Eng-
land Community Development Corporation (NECDC). With no previous busi-
ness or managerial experience, Blackett found himself at the helm of
two faltering corporations. RDC was a profit-making endeavor oriented
towards housing in the declining communities of Roxbury, Mass. (in Bos-
ton). Unfortunately, despite RDC's lofty ideals, it had failed miser-
ably in attempting to make ghetto housing a profitable venture. NECDC,
a non-profit corporation, was the social services extension of RDC, and
had hopes of counseling tenant family problems in the neighborhoods
where RDC would eventually put its housing. With the advent of Blackett
as the first full-time director, a new approach to producing decent hous-
ing in the ghetto was sought.
A new corporation, Housing Innovations, Inc. (HII) was conceived
in 1966 to avoid the failures of RDC. HII would replace RDC by special-
izing in a program of physical rehabilitation and home ownership for
low-income families.- NECDC would remain in its present form, and con-
currently offer educational and social back-up programs for potentiel
homeowners. By 1967, however, the idea of dual corporations working in
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tandem was further refined. A new non-profit corporation, the Founda-
tion for Housing Innovations (FHI), was established solely for fund-
raising purposes. All tax deductible donations or foundation grants
received in support of HII's housing programs would then be deposited
into FHI. Therefore, the other half of the duo, HII, could concentrate
strictly on operational and administrative affairs.
The rationale for a dual corporate concept is notable in retrospect
for several reasons. Initially, the combined profit/non-profit struc-
ture related directly to the original objectives of homeownership for
poor families. HII had surveyed a black area of Roxbury-North Dorches-
ter (in Boston) for the purposes of launching a concentrated rehabili-
tation program. After gathering demographic and census statistics on
this neighborhood, Blackett put together a package for an experimental
pilot project aimed at creating a resident-owned 3-block neighborhood.
Specifically, HII would acquire absentee-owned properties for immediate
rehabilitation and eventual sale to potential minority homeowners with-
in the concentrated three block area. A 100% financing mechanism was
evolved so that low and moderate income families could purchase their
homes with no down payment on the mortgage. In turn, the families
could then own and live in their three story home, rent-out the two re-
maining apartment units (for additional income), and maintain the build-
ing themselves. The underlying assumption was that if poor families in
the ghetto could enjoy the benefits of homeownership, community pride
would be increased, and property values would stab lize.
The 100% financing plan called 'for FHI to supply the difference be-
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tween the conventional mortgage (generally 75-80% of the sales price),
and the amount of the down payment the homeowner could not afford. This
"equity balance" on the downpayment would be treated as a second loan,
and placed by FHI with the conventional mortgagee. The homeowner would
then have a mortgage constant that amortized the principal on both loans
plus the annual interest accrued. When the mortgage was reduced by ~the
amount of FHI's loan (plus interest), the money would be released to FHI, who
then repeats the process and reinvests the amount into other rehabili-
tated structures ready for ownership. By demonstrating both the via-
bility of the 100% financing mechanism (in the pilot project) and the
soundness of investing in rehabilitated ghetto housing, FHI hoped to at-
tract private capital with the promise of a reasonable return on the
investment (5% on a ten year note).
Blackett needed to raise $395,000 for the pilot project, in order
to capitalize the equity block deposits, and to run the program. His
goal was to randomly solicit donations which would then be funnelled in-
to the non-profit FHI. Then, FHI would fuind HII with an initial capi-
talization of $30,000 plus a contractural consultant's agreement calling
for FHI to retain HII's services for $4,800 per month. In return, HII
would repay any of its surplus profit back to FHI.
Based upon the original objectives of FHI/HII, a non-profit frame-
work was conceived by the directors of the corporations for several
reasons:
1. Blackett felt FHI had to go the non-profit route- because no one
would be serious about investing in a profit-making company doing re-
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habilitation work in the ghetto. Blackett was also of the opinion that
financial support of Black economic development was nonexistent in 1967,
although a small portion of the white community was concerned about a-
meliorating the present condition of the ghetto in some charitable fash-
ion. Moreover, in the early sixties (especially before the assassination
of Martin Luther King) aspiring Black entrepreneurs were unable to re-
ceive conventional financial backing.
2. In part, the two-pronged corporate idea was a carry-over from
the earliest relationship between RDC and NECDC, where business enter-
prise and social welfare were unsuccessfully combined in a joint pro-
gram of minority community imporvement. Two important lessons were
learned from these earlier experiences. First, RDC and NECDC had been
previously directed by white suburban and professional intellectuals
who were motivated by their own notions of social justice for the ghetto.
Many members pictured themselves as absentee landlords morally commited
to upgrading the lives of ghetto residents. But, to translate
some of these noble sentiments into reality, a business oriented or
pragmatically run company detached from the human services component
needed to be responsible for implementing feasible programs. Second,
the 'people involved in this action oriented component should be com-
posed of individuals working full time, and who have definite long term
ties to the community where the housing is being produced.
3. FHI and HII were separated for still another strategic reason.
It was anticipated that FHI, the financial arm, would be dominated by
prestigious board members, known in white business and philanthropic
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circles. This was considered essential to any successful fund-raising
effort, and precisely for that reason, FHI's board of directors included
white ministers, business school professors, and social-minded business-
men. Furthermore, the arrangement was structured so that the board con-
trolled only FHI's operations, while HII under Blackett's management
would then be free to conduct its real estate consultant's services
without the interference from FHI's board of directors.
Nonetheless, whatever the motivating rationale at the time, the
FHI/HII combination and its novel homeownership program were unique,
and proved to be the hallmark of the fund-raising campaign. An aggres-
sive effort was launched with the various members of FHI's board es-
tablishing contacts, and Blackett following through with the presen-
tation and salesmanship. The intensive campaign lasting well into
the Fall and Winter of '67-'68, unfolded as a crucial transition for
Blackett. His former training and experiences as an architect-planner
had not adquately exposed him to the rigors of becoming a professional
corporate fund-raiser. However, the nature of the job enabled Blackett
to learn firsthand the financial aspects of his operations, and most
importantly, enabled him to make his entry into the real estate de-
velopment business.
The final outcome of the FHI/Hi1'~drive was that $479,020 was
raised in donations, grants, and investments. This.amount included a
private donation of $50,000., a Ford Foundation two year grant of $132,
C00 specified for salaries and administrative over-head incurred dur-
ing the home-ownership rehabilitation project, and a John Hancock Mu-
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tual Life Insurance Co. loan of $175,000 (at 5% due in 10 years) ear-
marked exclusively for potential homeowners as either a down-payment
loan or second mortgage.
By the summer of 1968, with the fund-raising- campaign concluded
FHI/HII began purchaisng properties within its defined 3 block area.
However, with the actual implementation of the pilot project underway,
relations between certain members of FHI and HII became strained. The
internal disputes that arose were primarily the growing pains experi-
enced by two fledgling corporations struggling to work cooperatively.
During the course of the first year several alternatives affecting the
general directions of the companies were discussed. Blackett
was strongly motivated toward steering HII into the field of real es-
tate development. This is significant because neither Blackett nor his
staff at that time were fully prepared or competent to handle the com-
plexities of housing development. On the other hand, FHI governed by
its white board of directors was pre-occupied solely with the comple-
tion of the pilot program, and the expenditure of funds raised for that
purpose.
The controversy.among the directors smouldered for months, and
eventually erupted over two points of contention -- the financial con-
trols regulating both HII & FHI, and HII's recent commitments to new
construction (the Boston Infill Housing program).
From its inception, FHI had set the precedent of having its Board
of Directors also serve as an executive committee supervising that com-
pany's operations. But. by late Fall of '68, the Board had gradually-
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become ineffective in keeping abreast with the day-to-day developments
of FHI. Nor could they maintain a watchful eye peering over the shoul-
ders of Blackett and his activities with HII. The growing impotence of
the board was further exacerbated by the realization that HII was behind
schedule on its pilot project, and quickly losing money in the process.
In an effort to regain their foothold on corporate policy, several
board members began demanding monthly financial accounts on the func-
tioning of HII. Without a full-time accountant or bookkeeper, Blackett
was unable to produce the financial records FHI's board had begun to
require.
The bitter fruits of this experience imprinted deeply upon Blackett
that absolute necessity of his being constantly knowledgeable about the
company's fiscal position. A developer, he soon learned, must be able
to "reduce reality into dollars and cents." Today, as a direct corol-
lary to that episode, Blackett has now over-compensated, as he phrases
it, by delegating five (one accountant and two financial ana-lysts and
bookkeepers) of his current staff of nineteen employees solely to HII's
financial structure. Moreover, Blackett himself (as president of HII)
is more conscious of the priorities he sets on his time, and of the
critical need to invest his energies into the vital details of finance
and politics, rather than the architectural planning of the development
per se.
* The other point of contention centered around the future direction
of FHI/HII in light of the purposes set forth in the three block pilot
project. In Blackett's mind, the overriding and most immediate objective
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to be realized was the attraction of private capital into a home owner-
ship program for poor Black families. The main thrust of the FHI scheme
was to reduce to a minimum the downpayment lump sum needed by families
to obtain a mortgage. In actuality, the original 100% financing mechan-
ism was restructured to include public (government) funds. The big
reason for the change lay in the fact that the Federal Housing Authority
(FHA) instituted, in 1969, a new policy of insuring mortgages within
the inner city. Both the FHA, on the federal level and the Boston Hous-
ing Authority (BHA), on the local level, participated in the revised
FHI financing arrangement. As Blackett later testified, working in the
system (the white financial community) meant using the existing agencies
and institutions (FHA and BHA), and not setting up new ones (as was
the plan in the pilot project of matching FHI's equity funds with
conventional financing). The arrangement that eventually worked out
was as follows:
1. The acquisition and rehabilitation of the houses were
financed by interim construction loan funds from Unity
Bank & Trust (a minority managed commercial bank) under
a guarantee from John Hancock. The Insurance Company's
$300,000 takeout mortgage commitment allowed FHI/HII to
purchase the properties and complete the rehabilitation
without FHA's preliminary appraisal.
2. Upon completion of the rehabilitation, the building was
inspected by FHA officials who took into account the
fifteen year leasing agreement with the BHA, determined
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a final appraisal value, and insured the mortgage
for a twenty-five year term.
3. The property was then sold to the home owner through the
Boston Banks Urban Renewal Group. A coalition of twenty-
three Boston area banks formed in 1967 to pool assets for
high risk mortgage for Black families buying homes out-
side of Roxbury. The group invested more than $27 mil-
lion in federally guaranteed mortgage loans for Black
families based upon the FHA insurance guanantee.
4. FHA insurance program (Section 221(d) (2)) allowed a minimum
downpayment of $200 per unit or 3% of purchase price. If
homeowners were unable to make any downpayment, equity
funds were available through the John Hancock loan ($175,
000).
Once the financing was perfected, unforseen problems arose in try-
ing to sell the homes to Black families. Any attempts at minimal re-
habilitation for eventual home ownership proved infeasible. HII was not
able to acquire and rehabilitate the units by FHA guidelines plus offer
a competitive price with the extras most prospective low income home ow-
ners wanted. In reality, HII was involved in only partial re-
habilitation installing new electrical and mechanical equip-
ment, but with no new-kitchen or bathroom fixtures. -Further-
more, it was a tricky marketing .concept to sell homes in a
declining residential negihborhood at a price far in excess
of its true mark.et value, particualrly when many Black families
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were not enthusiastic about owning a home in Grove Hall (the
three block area). In fact, FHI/HII was unexpectedly caught
against the expanding migration of Black families moving out
from the South End and the Roxbury sections of Boston into the
suburban living of Mattapan and Jamaica Plain.
Fortunately, a fifteen year leasing agreement with the
BHA, especially for those tenants qualifying for public hous-
ing assistance, made the pilot project profitable to rent.
Thus, FHI/HII's home ownership concept was never really tes-
ted. By December of 1970, HII had acquired and rehabilitated
fifty units without one home being sold to the tenants. The
important lesson learned was expressed in a Ford Foundation
Report which stated that, in general, homeowners would rather
move out of an area, buy a home which appears in good con-
dition located in a better neighborhood rather than remain
and invest in a completely rehabilitated house in a decaying
environment. Moreover, any decent rehab in a depressed mar-
ket simply inflated the actual value of the structure. For
potential homeowners, it was a poor investment.
Perhaps the most important long range objective of consequence
to Blackett was the growth of a self-sustaining real estate firm. For this
reason, he was not inflexible about the success or failure
of the pilot project-. Blackett w-as primarily motivated to
get something accomplished, produced and built -- be it re-
habilitation or new construction. Although he was not know-
ledgeable about real estate development when he was first
asked to become the president of HII, Blackett was most
earnst and serious about promoting FHI/HII as a successful
enterprise, and therefore stayed closest to the operations,
learning the mechanics of the business in a hurry.
In the early years of HII, Blackett was determined to
build a credible firm, with proven developmental capabilities.
His task at this juncture of FHI/HII's history was literally
to get his foot into the door, persistently leveraging when-
ever possible his unique credentials and talents. As an MIT
graduate and Fulbright Scholar, Blackett was an extremely
intelligent, well educated, highly ambitious young man. His
ability to project and sell helped to establish a workable
rapport with the white financial community. Moreover, it was
purely a pragmatic decision on his part to expand HII as a
real estate development company by coupling his limited cap-
ital with enormous expenditures of time and effort in ob-
taining new contracts to produce additional housing units.
Therefore in order to maintain HII's momentum, Blackett real-
ized the expediency of keeping the company involved in viable
and profitable development' projects.
Several of the board of directors of FHI, however, were
.not in accord with Blackett's far reaching objectives for
HII. They preferred that FHI/HII remain with its original
<oals set forth in the experimental three block pilot project,
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and not divert the companies resources. Beyond the fact that
they were volunteering their time to see the fruition of that
home ownership program, many directors had narrow expecta-
tions about the future of HII after the pilot project. Con-
sequently, they were alarmed and angered when Blackett began
to pursue contracts to build more housing at a time when he
was not moving along as planned in the three block rehabili-
tation program. They were also worried about his apparent
lack of concern for informing FHI's subscribers of his inten-
tions to expand beyond what the funds were initially donated
for.
When Blackett secured an agreement with the BRA to build
100 units of housing on vacant lots scattered throughout cer-
tain sections of Boston, FHI's board of directors split into
factions over their reaction to the event. Several members
were in favor of Blackett's initiative to find other projects
besides the pilot project to survive on. They felt respon-
sibility only as policy makers, outlining broad directions
in which HII1 might grow. A few directors were visibly up-
set over Blackett's contract for Infill housing. They wanted
authority and control, as technical advisors, over the expen-
ditures of funds. As a group, they were inflexible about
discussing long range plans until the pilot project-research
had been sufficiently investigated. A third. groupiwithin the
Board, was ambivalent to either side, and felt confused over
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who should legitimately shape the operational affairs of
FHI/HII and to what type of role the Board of Directors
should play in determining corporate goals. A few members
of the third group resigned, and were followed later by
those board members who were in opposition to expanding the
development activities of FHI/HII.
The BRA Infill Housing program was a combined federal
and city undertaking geared toward producing new homes (up to
six bedrooms) for large low-income families by building on
unsightly non tax producing vacant properties in Boston.
Every developer designated to build on any site had to work
in conjunction with and obtain approval from the local Model
Cities Neighborhood Board, and area residents of that com-
munity. Construction of the first Infill prototype was
originally scheduled to begin in late '68. However, bureau-
cratic delays and labor problems on the job held-up final
closing until May 1970. Construction financing was handled
by MHFA at 7 1/2% interest.
While HII/FHI had their Infill units under construction,
Washington changed. the focus of the program. HUD refused to
accept the higher New England prototype costs which exceeded
the mortgage limits per unit. Thus, plagued by rising costs
and the difficulty of building the housing on scattered sites,
HII had. to. resort to a turnkey program whereby it sold the
finished. units to the .BHA who then rented out the large family
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housing to those low income residents who qualified for pub-
lic housing assistance.
The shift from rehabilitation to new construction had
touched of f heated opposition from certain FHI board members; but
Blackett prevailed, justifying the switchover for the follow-
ing reasons:
1. Infill housing was not inconsistent with FHI/HII's
commitment to create ways for low-income families to own
their own homes.
2. Infill housing would provide Black subcontractors with
a rare opportunity to be general contractors in new housing.
3. The short term effect of producing Infill would be
for FHI/HII to stay alive financially.
By early 1971, three Infill prototypes had been build. Sub-
sequent approval came from HUD in April, and the first groups
of houses were sold to the BHA in November. As of 1973, all
one hundred units of Infill have been built. Ninety-four were
sold under the turnkey program, and six were retained (and
are now managed) by HII.
Financially, Infill was a marginally profitable venture.
But HII's involvement in Infill proved beneficial in other
respects, namely:
1. The activity generated in producing new housing was
sufficient to sustain an.d carry a larger full-time staff for
several years.
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2. HII emerged as the only developer in Boston to pro-
duce Infill housing units. This achievement of scattered
site, large family housing, increased tremendously the cred-
ibility of HII's. track record, and enabled the firm to grow
in the way and manner necessary for the survival of a new
real estate development company.
3. Infill became a model of performance that enabled
Blackett to attract additional corporate financing to pack-
age new projects.
4. A 10% (of the $2.56 million construction contract)
letter of credit provided by the New England Merchants Na-
tional Bank as the construction guarantee, enabled HII to
form its subsidiary, HII Construction Co., Inc. The company
was originally intended to include construction supervision
only; however, HII could not persuade any other contractor
to undertake their entire Infill contract. Consequently, the
subsidiary was formed to become the general contractor. (By
the close of 1972, the company had active construction con-
tracts totaling $6.4 million.)
During the latter half of 1969, FHI/HII found itself
rapidly approaching a deficit financial position, particu-
larly so with the Ford Foundation grant expiring in February
of the following year. The company was essentially suffer-
ing from an insufficient volume of development activity to
support its growing staff and rising overhead. . Therefore,
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during the Fall of '69, Blackett began negotiating for a sub-
stantial private placement of funds into his corporation
through the sale of HII stock or debentures. He made a for-
mal request to John Hancock for $400,000 - $500,000 of ad-
ditional funding. over the next two years.
In January of '70, Hancock agreed to a fully subordinated
loan of $300,000 to HII at 8 1/2% with warrants attached to
convert an additional $100,000 to equity at a later date.
Within the same agreement, Hancock also bought 10% of HII's
stock (note: state laws restrict mutual insurance companies
to investments of only 10% in any one corporation) for an-
other $100,000. Blackett controls the remaining 90% of HII's
stock.
The $400,000 investment by Hancock was the turning point
in HII's history. The improved financial status of HII en-
abled Blackett to solve HII's immediate cash problems, and
bring to an end HII's finiancial dependence upon FHI. Later
in the year, Blackett proposed that HII assume all of FHI's
properties and commitments. The merger was approved in De-
cember of 1970. FHI's assets were liquidated, and its re-
maining liabilities taken over by HII. The non-profit en-
tity of FHI was phased out of existence.
The importance of Hancock's money to the survival of
HII cannot be overstated. The insurance company's initial
loan of $175,000 was part of the approximately $55 million
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Hancock had pledged to invest (mostly in mortgages) in re-
sponse to the insurance industry's billion dollar commit-
ment to inner cities across the country. FHI's pilot pro-
ject and Blackett's impressive salesmanship offered Hancock
the unique opportunity of following through on a portion of
their pledge. Later in March of '69, the Mortgage Dept. at
Hancock guaranteed a $300,000 standby commitment for FHI re-
habilitation work only, so that HII could negotiate construc-
tion loans, land options, and mortgage financing. This stand-
by commitment was increased to half a million dollars in
March of '71. Although Hancock never donated any sums of
money to HII, the $400,000 investmentat a point in time when
HII had a negative net worth,was most unusual. Just recently
(at the end of 1972) the insurance company reaffirmed its
confidence in HII by converting additional long term debt in-
to equity during a major reorganization of the company.
Another financial institution important during HII's
early history has been the Massachusetts Housing Finance
Agency (MHFA) . HII has placed mortgages totaling $15 million
with the state housing agency in its Infill housing (includ-
ing the first loan commitment made by MHFA) and in its Federal
236 rehabilitation projects. HII has worked with MHFA for
several reasons:
1. MHFA offers both interim financing and below market
interest ra-tes on its permanent mortgages.
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2. As a state authority, it does not require FHA for
permanent financing.
3. Restricted to new housing in Massachusetts, MHFA
processes its own Federal (236) subsidies in much quicker
time than HUD.
In the past three years ('70-'72) , HII has successfully
utilized the 1969 "167K" revision to the federal tax laws,
which encourages the rapid depreciation of rehabilitated
housing within the inner city for low and moderate income
families. HII organized Intervale Associates in 1970 as one
of the first limited partnerships in the country to be formed
under the new tax incentives. Financing for the fourteen
rehab units was placed through MHFA. The following year,
HII organized Norfield Associates, another limited partner-
ship to take advantage of the 167K revision. Additional sub-
sidies came through the Section 236 and the Rent Supplement
programs via MHFA, who again provided the construction and
mortgage financing. The construction contract, in excess
of $600,000 for the rehabilitation of the forty five units,
was handled by HII Construction, Co. In 1972, HII formed a
third limited partnership to rehabilitate 149 housing units
scattered about the Boston Model Cities area. Through its
affiliate organizations, HII served as developer, general
partner, and general contractor for Lawrenceville Associates.
A $2.58 million mor.tgaI e was granted from MHFA, and the syn-
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dication of the limited partnership interests was sold by
Paine, Weber, Jackson & Curtis (a Wall Street brokerage and
investment banking firm). Completion of the units is sched-
uled for the Fall of this year. Management of all the re-
habilitated units has been shifted out of HIII, and now comes
under the Tenant Services, Inc. of the parent company HII
Corporation. (See reorganization diagram, p. 111)
Five years after the fact, Blackett today concedes that
it was accidental how he personally became involved in and
the head of his own real estate development company. Had he
started ten years ago, he would not have suffered through the
"dumb approach" he was forced to improvise. The classic
route, cites Blackett, is to do your apprenticeship with
a top-flight development corporation, and then branch out
armed- with valuable know-how, contacts, and a strong sense
of direction. Blackett also emphasizes the necessity of at-
tracting ample capital first, to ensure a neophyte developer
the lag time needed to plan and initiate new development pro-
jects. FIII/HII's model, explains Blackett, is all backwards.
The firm went from rehabilitation to new construction, from
non-profit status to generating profits and attracting inves-
tors. Normally, most development corporations start out at
the point where HII arrived at in 1971 (with the final dis-
solution of FHI).
Blackett sums up the early years of FHI/HII as follows:
-108-
"... efforts to develop a 100% financing without using
FHA, based upon substantial block deposits of 20% of the
mortgage amount is not really viable over the long run. The
most important and productive service we (HII) can provide
for low income tenants and potential homeowners would be to
devise ways to inject them into the normal business proce-
dures of the greater American community.
It is also my feelings that the non-profit vehicle while
ideal for trying out both new programs and untested manage-
ment personnel, is probably not the best vehicle for actively
producing substantial units of housing."
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HOUSING INNOVATIONS, INC. (HII)
50 FRANKLIN STREET
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02110
DENIS A. BLACKETT, PRESIDENT
Chronology
June 1966
April 1967
Summer 1967
September 1967
February 1968
March 1968
Summer 1968
Fall 1968
March 1969
January 1970
March 1970
November 1970
December 1970
March 1971
HII formed as an operating entity. Blac-
kett became director; surveyed 35-block
area of Roxbury-North Dorchester and iden-
tified 3-block pilot project area.
FHI formed as a financial adjunct to HII.
Begin 3 block pilot project program.
Blackett spearheads fund-raising for pi-
lot project.
Ford Foundation awards FHI $132,500.
John Hancock makes note purchase agreement
for $175,000 at 5% due April 1978 to be
used exclusively for FHI's pilot project.
FHI begins acquisition of buildings in
pilot project.
FHI designated developer for 100 units
of Infill Housing.
John Hancock makes available $300,000
standby commitment.
John Hancock approves $400,000 investment
in HII, $300,000 in long term debentures
and $100,000 in equity.
HII completes first Infill prototype.
Formation of HII Construction Co.,' Inc.
a subsidiary of HII.
FHI transfers its assets and liabilities
to HII.
Hancock increased standby commitment to
$500,000.
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October 1972
December 1972
December 1972
HII Realty Corp., a subsidiary to hold
all properties and mortgages of HII.
John Hancock converts its $300,000 long
term debentures into stock. Formation
of HII Corporation, a holding company,
principal subsidiary Housing Innovations,
Inc. (HII).
Tenant Services, Inc. a subsidiary of
HII Corporation; manages the housing units
-of HII.
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PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPERS
FOOTNOTES
UNITED COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, INC.
Infomration for this came from several interviews with:
Mr. Lawrence R. Smith, President, UCD,. 12 February, 6 March,
9 May 1973.
Also from the following periodicals:
Anthony Yudis "Project that isn't a Project," Boston
Globe, 4 March 1973.
"Primack and CBT Realty Handle UCD Financing," New Eng-
land Real Estate Journal, 20 October 1973.
UNION INSURANCE AND REALTY CO.
The primary source of facts for this case was gathered from
interviews held with:
H. M. Michaux, Sr., President,. 19 March 1973.
Eric. C. Michaux, Vice President, 19 March 1973.
JOHN W. WINTERS & COMPANY
This case was compiled from an interview with
John W. Winters, 18 March 1973
and from:
Berkeley G. Burrell and John Seper, Getting It Together:
Black Businessmen in America (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovano-
vich, Inc. 1971), Chapter 9, pp. 84-104.
H. J. RUSSELL
Background for this case history came from interviews with H. J. Russell,
and his legal assistant Al ThQmpson. 26 March 1973.
1. Alex Poinset., "From Plaster to Plutocrat," Ebony, May'1973, p. 85. The
four states are Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee and South Carolina.
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2. Ibid., p. 87. The article claims that Russell has a
net worth of nearly $10 million.
3. Tom Walker, "It's More Than a New Town," Atlanta Journal
and Constitution (February 25, 1973), p. 6E.
4. "The Quiet Giant," Atlanta, October 1972, P. 57.
5. Walker, "New Yown," p. lF.
6. Ibid.
7. Poinsett, "Plaster," p. 85.
8. "Giant," Atlanta, p. 58.
9. Poinsett, "Plaster," p. 90. Russell was joined by his
brother, Roger, who is now Vice President of the construction
company. Another brother runs his own plastering firm in At-
lanta.
10. Ibid.
11. Poinsett, "Plaster," p. 94.
12. "Giant, " Atlanta, p. 58.
13. Poinsett, "Plaster," p. 94.
14. 221(d) (4) is a market rate mortgage insurance program for
rental housing. Advantages of the program are its high loan
to value ratio -- 90% of the estimated replacement cost and
its extended amortization period. The mortgage for Pace
Setter Apartments is J. I. Kislak Mortgage Corp. of Florida
(a mortgage banking firm).
15. Brochure for Pace Setter Apartments.
16. Walker, "New Town," p. 6E.
17. 221(d)(3)is a below market interest rate mortgage insur-
ance program of rental housing for low and moderate income
families.
18. "Giant,_" Atlanta, p. 57.
19. Ibid., p. 60.
20. Gene Thorpe, "Shenandoah Gets$40 Million Guarantee,".
CASE STUDY: NON-PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPERS
-115-
ANALYSIS
This section includes two groups .of individuals who have been mo-
tivated to branch out into real estate development; but who remain af-
filiated with their professional specialities as the principle source of
livelihood and reputation.
Of all the cases studied in this thesis, Westside Professional
Associates Limited (WPAL) is the only one about commercial high-rise
development; and surprisingly enough, is being handled by a group of
men completely inexperienced with any previous type of land development.
This occurred because of the pressing need for first class office space
among the members of the partnership. As both professionals and as en-
trepreneurs, they have been motivated to satisfy an unmet socio-economic
need.
The financial package of WPAL was handled by legal professionals
who are apart of the partnership. They have been successful in augment-
ing their experience with friendly consultation from lawyers involved in
development in other parts of the country. Nevertheless, the building
is enduring its share of adversity. WPAL raised among its partners only
a portion (less than 20%) of the equity requirement needed to bridge the
gap between interim and permanent financing. Fortunately, WPAL hpd firm
loan commitments from some of the most reputable lenders in the region.
But the most serious obstacle encountered has been with the leasing of
the building. Current occupancy is below 40% and a major triple A (cre-
dit rated) tenant is desperately needed. Without a solid, long-term lease
from a principal first class tenant, the cash flow of earnings, the
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final placement of the mortgage, and the prestige of the office address
will all be severely affected.
H. A. .DeCosta Company has gradually moved into land development
because of two factors: (1) its experiences in building housing pro-
jects for other sponsors, and(2) its proven record of performance in
the contracting business. Utilizing little "front money" except that
needed for working capital and land options, the company is able to
receive institutional financing based primarily upon its reputation to
finish the job. In the future, DeCosta Company would like to inter-
mix more development work with its successful contracting operation by
expanding upon its market niche of specialized restoration work and
multi-family residential construction.
Summary: Non professionals in development are distinguishable from the
full time developers. Non professionals are less dependent upon equity
capital to sustain their operations during the long non-income producing
periods of development. If they have a reputable and solvent business
in another field, if they control the land to be developed, and if they
can maximize their contacts with additional expertise, non professionals
have only the major responsibility of obtaining permanent financing for
their project. Additionally, they are at liberty to approach develop-
ment more as an individual investor, who seeks to shield income from
other sources via tax savings from real estate ownership. Professional
developers must look to the early returns of the project's cash flow to
interest limited partners or to recapture its original investment.
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WESTSIDE PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATES, LIMITED (WPAL)
EAST INDEPENDENCE PLAZA
CHARLOTTE, N. C.
On the southeast fringe of downtown Charlotte, N. C., there stands
on a.six acre tract a new and prestigious mid-rise structure, slated
for occupancy May 1973. "Reflecting the new spirit of Charlotte,"
East Independence Plaza is an unusual office building in several respects.
First, the location of East Independence is at an extremely accessible
point, given the layout of Charlotte's Central Business District, and
the location of the new municipal and county governmental complex.
Within two bolcks of the Plaza, is an in-town shopping mall of 45 stores,
a downtown motor inn, and a new motel-convention center. The site lo-
cation also boasts of plenty of free parking, and easy access to all
the existing and planned perimeter expressways bordering the circum-
ference of downtown Charlotte.
Secondly, East Independence is owned by a limited partnership group,
Westside Professional Associated, Limited (WPAL) which is composed of
twenty-two business professionals, seventeen of whom are local Black
businessmen of the Charlotte community. It is this group of men who
-have spearheaded the construction of the seven story building situated
in the neighborhood that was formerly one of Charlotte's worst ghettos.
The octogonal shaped, tinted glass and yellow brick structure features
amenities competitive with any other first class office space in the
city. Occupying the first two floors will be the second all-Black
2
private multi-specialty medical clinic in the'state of North. Carolina.
Full Service banking is also offered in the lobby with a branch office
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of the Mechanics & Farmers Bank (a Black owned and operated financial
institution). But most significantly, the building represents the firm
conviction of those Black businessmen to join in and commit themselves
to the "future, the new spirit, of Charlotte."
The idea to build East Independence took shape three years ago in
the summer of 1970 when ten local doctors approached the law firm of
Chambers, Stein Ferguson & Lanning (CSF&L) about constructing a small
medical facility. The doctors had no specific guidelines in mind other
than their decision to pool their medical services together, and share
space in a single building with a group practice arrangement. Most of
the doctors, dissatisfied with their present office facilities, were
actively interested in a new medical office. Although they had no land,
each doctor could invest $10,000 a piece into the venture.
CSF&L steered the medical group toward a one acre parcel of land about
to be auctioned off by the Redevelopment Commission of the City of Char-
lotte (RCC). Plans were developed for a 30,000 square foot professional
building. By February of 1971, however CSF&L's office was burned
they too found themselves in the market for new office space. Conse-
quently, the law firm and the doctors decided to join forces, formed
WPAL and bid on a larger urban renewal parcel of six acres. Fortunately
the market demand for the parcel was negligible, and WPAL was the only
group to submit a bid on that property site. Their bid of 1 cent per
square foot above the minimum RCC base price was adequate, and they
were awarded the rights to purchase and develop the property.
Despite the fact 'that WPAtJ had subinitted a proposed plan of de-
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velopment, the group was not definite as to how they planned to stage
the construction. A feasibility study was conducted, and subsequently
revealed that their original scheme of three small (30,000 sq. ft.)
office buildings staggered over three phases of construction was not
fully utilizing the land, based upon the value of the property. After
further planning, it was agreed to build a single seven story building
which maximized the use of the land within the constraints of RCC par-
king requirements but without adding a multi-level parking garage. Long
range plans call for a second building, similar to the first, on the far
side of the rectangular site. An enlarged parking facility would also be
included. The present building has a gross area of 104,000 sq. ft. and
a net leaseable space of 87,000 sq. ft.
WPAL raised $145,000 as equity from among themselves. All the
original ten doctors remained as partners, now joined by an optometrist,
two pharmacists, and the nine principles of CSF&L. In addition to being
owners, the doctors, optometrist, pharmacists, and lawyers who were
partners in WPAL will also occupy in excess of 30% of the leaseable
space. Because none of the doctors were knowledgeable about the in-
tricacies of real estate development (particularly speculative office
space) the partnership looked to the law firm for direction. This re-
sponsibility fell principally on the shoulders of two men, Julius Cham-
bers, the senior law partner, and Melvin Watt, CSF&L's corporate at-
torney.
Widely considered one of the most prominent civil rights attorneys
practicing in the country, Chambers is a hard driving, 36 year old cor-
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porate businessman who first came to Charlotte in 1964 to start his
law practice. He had previously obtained a master's degree in his-
tory from the University of Michigan, a law degree from the University
of North Carolina, and had completed a masters in law at Columbia Uni-
versity while serving a year of internship with the NAACP Legal De-
fence Fund in New York. Upon returning to his home state,. Chambers
immediately began looking for office space. Not wishing to be based
exclusively in the heart of the Black community, Chambers sought of-
fice space downtown. Soliciting for available space, he was flatly
refused and openly laughed at. Finally, he had to settle for a one
room office, a "cold water flat," above a finance company in a second
3
class rent district off from the central core of downtown. Later,
Chambers took on two partners, establishing one of the few biracial
law firms in the South (the first in Charlotte), and was immediately
back into the market for uptown office space.
In 1965, Chambers, in association with the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund, filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the desegregation
of public schools in compliance with a previous U.S. Supreme Court rul-
ings. The now historic school desegregation lawsuit of Swann vs.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education culminated after six years of
countless hearings, motions, and appeals, with the Supreme Court's un-
animous decision to affirm the lower court's ruling to. desegregate.
During the protracted court battle, and the broader civil rights
movement engulfing the South (in the sixties), Chambers had his home.
bombed and his office (a.reconverted house) burned down. But his law
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practice continued to grow, and Chambers resumed again his search for
first class downtown office space. After being turned down repeatedly,
Chambers finally threatened to sue in order to rent available space in
a downtown hotel. Approval was given only after the Board of Directors
of the hotel in New York met to discuss the matter. Weary of the prob-
lems of locating office space, Chambers decided to join the doctors
and expand the scale of the proposed building.
When financing was arranged in the summer of 1971, lenders were
bullish on the office retail market in Charlotte. WPAL received several
firm commitments from some of the major financial institutions in the
state. WPAL was able to mortgage out the total replacement cost (minus
land) of the building for $2.7 million. Construction financing was sup-
plied by North Carolina National Bank (the second largest in the state
with headquarters in Charlotte), and the permanent mortgage was placed
with Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (of New York). A land sale
leaseback commitment is also available which would allow WPAL, in ef-
fect, to finance the purchase of the land. This commitment can be
exercised at the option of WPAL in the event no alternative method is
available to purchase the land. The leaseback arrangement is with Tri-
South Mortgage investors, an equity real-estate investment trust (of
which North Carolina National Bank is a major sponso). Construction of
the building is being supervised by a local general contractor.
Financially, East Independence Plaza is structured to break even
at 85% occupancy. Presently, the building is pre-leased at 40% of ca-
pacity. In an effort to secure more tenants, .especially a reputable
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blue chip corporate tenant, a major marketing campaign has been
launched. To direct the effort, a public relations firm was hired,
plus a full-time leasing agent. To date the white business community
and government agencies have remained on the sidelines applauding the
attractiveness of the building, but declining to lease any space.
In discussing the matter with the leasing agent, two factors were
singled out as the major handicaps precluding the successful rental
of East Independence Plaza. The office building market, in the span
of two years, has been swamped with an abundance of new space. The
availability of office space has switched from a rather tight market in
1971 to a soft one in 1973. Since August 1971 nine additional major
office buildings (including East Independence) have been announced,
totaling 1,661,700 sq. ft. Topping off the list is a 36 and 40 story
high-rise complex anchored by the two largest banks in the state. There-
fore the supply of prime downtown office space has mushroomed. Many
of these major developments began pre-leasing their buildings two to
three years before actual construction. Unfortunately, East Indepen-
dence has been caught in the market deluge.
The other big obstacle to securing tenants revolves around the
issue of race. Chambers states that the Charlotte community cannot
ignore the issue of Black ownership, and simply utilize the prime
space on the merits of its desirable qualities. He concludes that whites
are still reluctant to live, attend schools, or work in areas inhabited
by Blacks. But he nevertheless remains hopeful of filling the building
with Black and white tenants.
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Through a network of personal contacts and leads, Chambers and
his law partners were able to put together the financial package of
East Independence. Friendly advice and know-how was volunteered on
several occasions by such business associates. For example, WPAL
decided to form a limited partnership to pass all losses through to
the partners involved. An exculpatory clause was incorporated which
limits the lender to the assets of the property as collateral for the
loan. In turn, the Internal Revenue Service looks upon the structure
as equal liability spread among both the general and limited partners.
As Mel Watt commented, CSF&L did not have the expertise to structure
the package alone, but the entire process has been an invaluable edu-
cational experience increasing the legal resources of the law firm.
Chambers reaffirms the thought in a different manner. His invest-
ment in East Independence is proof of his investment in the future of
Charlotte. Moreover, his commitment is basically an extension from
his paramount priority of .contributing to the community through his law
practice. He continues by pointing out that the successful law suits
of his law office have had, and will continue to have, more impact on
a local and state-wide level than the fruition of one seven story build-
ing lodged downtown between several other 30 story office towers. But
he does not dismiss the fact that East Independence is a start for Blacks
in Charlotte to begin controlling something that directly affects their
lives. Many Blacks, he feels, would like to see much more Black owned
development, but someone has to go ahead and be the mover, the organizing
catalyst. Otherwise the new spirit of Charlotte, to which Chambers and his
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partners refer to, will again omit the active participation of its
Black community.
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WESTSIDE PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATES, LIMITED (WPAL)
EAST INDEPENDENCE PLAZA
CHARLOTTE, N.C.
Chronology
1964 Julius Chambers arrives in Charlotte to start a
law practice
1965 Chambers files school desegregation lawsuit of Swann
vs. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board o-f Education.
Chamber's home is bombed.
1970 Group of doctors approached Chambers about building
a small medical facility
1971 CSF&L's office is burned down.
WPAL awarded six acre tract of urban renewal land
1972 Construction begins on East Independence Plaza
1973 Seven story office building is 40% occupied.
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H. A. DECOSTA COMPANY
93 SPRING STREET
CHARLESTOWN, SOUTH CAROLINA 29403
H. A. DECOSTA, JR. PRESIDENT
H. A. DeCosta Company is a general contracting firm that bas been
operating in the State of South Carolina for 54 years. Looking at the
entire construction industry across the nation, DeCosta Company would
be classified as a small business with a construction volume approaching
four million dollars for 1973. But among minority contracting firms,
H.A. DeCosta Company is certainly one of the oldest, and is among the
larger Black operated construction firms in the Southeast. Since 1968,
the company has built over 600 apartments under the federal 221(d)(3)
5
program. Construction work undertaken by the firm in the past ten
years nas been varied, including extensive restoration work (which is
the hallmark of the firm's reputation) commercial renovation, and the
construction of new churches, educational facilities, and residential
structures. Additionally, the company has obtained federal contracts
with such governemntal agencies as the Veteran Administration, the U.S.
Navy (the Charleston Naval Yard) arid, of course, H.U.D. Its restoration
work over the years has involved individual home owners, the Historic
Charleston Foundation, and the College of Charleston.6
H. A. DeCosta Company was started in 1919 by Herbert DeCosta, Sr.
who had just completed military service in World War I. He specialized
in renovation and restoration work, and quickly established himself as
a master craftsman. That part of Charleston with its unique architec-
ture and flavor was a ready market for skillful contractors desiring
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to restore the citizen's historic buildings and homes. DeCosta, Sr.
enjoyed a thriving business, and was joined by his son, a trained
architectural engineer in 1947. The company was incorporated in Jan-
uary 1948, with DeCosta, Sr. remaining at the helm until his death in
1960, at which time, H.A. DeCosta, Jr. became president. This rep-
resented the third generation of DeCostas to own and operate a con-
struction firm in Charleston. The grandfather had started a firm
before the turn of the twentieth century, but died at the early age of
45 while his son H. A. DeCosta, Sr. was still in high school. There
was a time lapse between the grandfather's death and the father's
entry into the business, the only break in the link of three genera-
tions of continuous Black ownerslip in one company.
As a board member of the National Association of Minority Con-
tractors, DeCosta, Jr. has become widely exposed to the specific prob-
lems of Black owned construction firms in this country. He stated his
reasons for surviving as follows:
1. a trained staff -- the caliber of his organizational backup
enables the company to diversify its business and bid intelligently
on any type of job.
2. stability of the company -- H. A. DeCosta has been in business
since 1919, and has a proven capability to complete a project once it
is awarded the contract. In addition, such a proven record ensures the
company adequate lines of credit.
3. South Carolina is a non-union state -- the company has been
fortunate in avoiding the headaches of union disputes, strike-s and
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high labor costs. Minority contractors in the North attempting either
to start up a business or compete for larger projects often become
crippled with union problems, and never recover.
4. federal projects -- recent governmental contracts awarded to
minority construction companies, has presented the opportunity for these
businesses to expand and undertake bigger projects heretofore unavail-
able.
5. Black institutional clients -- a resurgence of Black pride
has encouraged community organizations to seek out and solicit the
talents of fellow professional groups. DeCosta Company as been se-
lected by many non-profit housing groups (particularly Black churches)
to build hundreds of federally financed units.
DeCosta, Jr. prefers however conventional projects to federally
sponsored ones. The lengthy delays and administrative red tape has in
the past often prevented the company from closing out a federal job
for as long as six months. The operational costs of having to wait
that long to get paid brought severe hardships on a small company like
his. But, he nevertheless feels federal help is indispensable. Pri-
vate capital cannot afford to build for poor people and come out pro-
fitably. Therefore, a governmental rent subsidy or interest subsidy
to promote low cost housing is a necessity in this day and time.
H. A. DeCosta's activities in real estate began -with DeCosta, Sr.
who would buy two-story houses (prevalent throughout Charleston), re-
model the structure, and then rent the units out to two families. This
operation continued with some new construction occuring (mostl-y four-
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plexes) in the early sixties on property where the units were too di-
lapidated to be renovated. With the advent of federally subsidized
housing, the company began building apartments for both limited divi-
dend or non-profit sponsors. Later, DeCosta began joint-venturing with
conventional developers, and erecting units of its own in between pro-
jects to keep its construction crews busy. DeCosta, Jr. would capit-
alize the fees for his in-house capabilities -- architectural planning
and construction management, as an equity but capital investment to
the company, and then obtain an interim loan for 100% of the con-
struction costs (pledged against the line of credit and the track re-
cord of the company). Meanwhile, a permanent lender is located, and
the apartment project is mortgaged out, often for an amount which
covers all development costs. Because the company is normally seeking
a conventional mortgage commitment within the $500,000 range, local
financial institutions feel comfortable in assurring the full amount of
the permanent loan on their investmerrt portfolio. Thus, from on-the-
job experiences of building either federally subsidized or convention-
ally financed housing, DeCosta Company has been able to control the
price of its units to within a predictable range and for a wide variety
of sites.
The Vice President of the fi-rm forsees a more venturesome role fer
the company as the initiator of a development team. In the future, con-
struction will remain the forte of H. A. DeCosta Company, but plans have
already been formulated for bigger development work. The .company has
recently purchased fifteen acres of land in Columbia, South Carolina
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(the capital and fastest growing metropolitan area in the state)
with plans proposed to build 52 apartment units and 80 townhouses. At
present, the architect is preparing preliminary schemes, but no finan-
cial commitments have been firmed up as yet. Two of the fifteen acrea
have been set aside for a convenience commerical s.hopping center.
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H. A. DeCOSTA COMPANY
93 SPRING STREET
CHARLESTON, S.C. 29403
H. A. DeCOSTA, JR., PRESIDENT
Chronology
1919 Herbert A. DeCosta organizes H.A. DeCosta, General
Contractor.
1947 H.A. DeCosta, Jr. comes into the business.
1948 Incorporated as H.A. DeCosta Company.
1960 Upon the death of H.A. DeCosta, his son H.A. DeCosta
Jr. became President Treasurer.
1968-
72 Company builds over 600 apartments with 140 units
under construction.
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NON-PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPERS
Westside Professional Associates, Limited
The major sources of- information for this case were compiled from three
interviews:
Julius L. Chambers, Senior partner of CSF&L, 12 March 1973.
Melvin L. Watt, corporate attorney of CSF&L, 12 March, 9 May 1973.
Roosevelt Maske, leasing agent for East Independence Plaza, 12 May 1973.
H. A. DeCosta Company
Private interviews were held with:
H. A. DeCosta, Jr. President, 23 March 1973.
William J. Clement, Vice President, 23 March 1973.
FOOTNOTES
1. This caption, "Reflecting the new spirit of Charlotte,"'highlights
East Independence Plaza's advertising campaign, and also appears on the
cover of their leasing brochures.
2. Charlotte Observer, 20 January 1972. The first all-Black multi-
specialty medical clinic is located in Greensboro, N.C., and was put
together by a group of local lawyers and doctors of the Black community.
The new clinic is also (as in WPAL) located on urban renewal land off
from downtown.
3. Lopez, Luisita, "Julius Chambers," Charlotte Observer, 10December
1972.
4. Ibid.
5. Resume of H. A. DeCosta Company, p. 3.
6. Ibid.,pp. 4-7.
CASE STUDY: COMMUNITY BASED DEVELOPERS
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ANALYSIS
The following collection of cases examines the development pro-
jects of three community based corporations. Attention is given to the
broad social objectives incorporated into these groups, and to its
practical implementation into physical structures. The three groups
studied are Low Cost Housing Corporation (LCHC), Roxbury Action Pro-
gram (RAP) , and United Durham, Inc. (UDI) . They are placed under the
label of community based developers because of their common character-
istics. Each organization came into existence to render services for
a specific group of community residents. RAP is based within the
Highland Park neighborhood of Roxbury, Mass. LCHC identifies with the
South End Community of Boston, and UDI encompasses the poor and low-
income residents of Durham, N.C. In all three organizational struc-
tures, local residents working in conjunction with technical advisors
plan and regulate the growth and direction of the organization. At UDI,
low incjme residents occupy two-thirds of the seats on the Board of
Directors, and own voting stock in the corporation. LCHC tenants doub-
le as policy directors and as paid employees working full time for the
corporation. RAP requires that all of its permanent staff live in
Highland Park. Local residents of the neighborhood serve as policy
consultants to the planning committees of each project.
The recent accomplishments of RAP, LCHC, and UDI in the field of
development has grown from their attempts to evolve innovative out-
reach programs of community benefit into financially sound, business
ventures. LCHC rehabilitates condemned apartment buildings below
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standard costs for occupaney by low income South End residents. RAP
has successfully packaged the rehab of several abandoned buildings in
the Highland Park area. UDI started, despite its gross inexperience,
with the manufacture of modular homes in a serious attempt to produce
inexpensive shelter within the price range of low income families.
Community based corporations, therefore, differ significantly from the
previous case studies of professional developers by their umbilical
ties to the geographically defined communities which they serve. These
groups are essentially recent attempts to cross-bred housing develop-
ment, political control, and social outreach into one manageable pack-
age.
It is also possible to conclude that governmental assistance, at
some level, has contributed substantially to the survival of each com-
munity group. UDI was funded with almost $2 million in equity capital
from the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). The $43,000 raised lo-
cally would not have been sufficient to launch the various enterprises
started by UDI. RAP would not have packaged its first rehab project
without the conveniences of federal tax incentives, or mortgage sub-
sidies. LCHC received its three year training grant from HUD to pay
for the expenses in upgrading unskilled minority construction workers.
The policy of the city of Boston to sale foreclosed properties housing
five story masonry shells for $1.00 per house, is in effect, a subsidy
to LCHC.
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LOW COST HOUSING CORPORATION (LCHC)
15 WORCESTER STREET
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02118
RUDY WAKER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
BILL DUKES, SUPERINTENDENT
Working together six days a week in the South End neigh-
borhood of Boston is an industrious group of Black people who
are providing housing for themselves and the local minority
residents of the area. This group, which calls itself Low
Cost Housing Corporation, (LCHC) is a family of low-income,
poor Black folk that is seeking to spread a sense of pride
and achievement among its members. Their aim is to produce
living units which they can either own or rent through their
own sweat and effort, and through the pooling together of
their individual talents and resources. Over the past five
years, they have assembled a track record of rehabilitated
units in the South End as well as a practical formula for
producing housing for other poor people.
Their approach begins with the legal structure of a non-
profit corporation which utilizes funding from a variety of
sources. LCHC will accept donations from individuals, char-
aties, or businesses, grants from the government, low in-
terest loans, and income generated from its own operations
(i.e., rents, and mortgage loans). The money is then applied
to sustain LCHC's "Grass Roots" program of self-help and
initiative. At the core is a permanent, professional, full-
time construction crew which does everything -- carpentry,
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plastering, plumbing, electrical work, painting, masonry work
plus the maintenance of the units rehabilitated by LCHC. The
crew also conducts an on-the-job training program for ten-
ants who desire employment. Backing up the crew is a shop
facility and building materials supply company. To augment
the work performed by LCHC's permanent contruction and ad-
ministrative staff, volunteer helpers from surrounding chur-
ches and schools, plus members from suburban civic groups
pitch-in and donate their labor and services.
The outcome of the approach is that housing is brought
on the market at the lowest possible rent, enabling most low-
income residents to pay their own way without governmental
subsidies. Average rents for a two bedroom apartment are
$95. per month and $105. per month for a three bedroom unit.
These rents apply to the nineteen buildings housing sixty-
six apartments completed under the Grass Roots program. Ten
additional buildings are presently undergoing rehabilitation.
LCHC produces its housing in the following method. They
purchase condemned,. five-story masonry rowhouses in the South
End at minimum cost (generally $1.00 per house) from the
Boston Redeivelopement Authority or from the City of Boston.
These buildiTgs are either abandoned, fire gutted, physical-
ly deteriorated, or destined for demolition. LCHC converts
the buildings to apartments,. installs a new heating system
and n-ew electrical wiring, re-furbishes and repaints the
walls, and install.s bathroom fixtures and kitchen appliances..
The permanent construction crew and its trainees rebuild
-138-
and rehabilitate a one story three bedroom apartment in ten
days for a basic rehab cost of $9,000. Volunteer help and
the hiring of tenants and local residents to assist the reg-
ular staff, reduces costs, and helps to recirculate LCHC's
rent and construction dollars.
In 1967, when LCHC was originally formed, the group be-
gan rehabilitating 73 units under the government's 221(d)(3)
program. The project was later converted to Section 236 to
take advantage of the lower interest rates (1% versus 3%
under 221(d) (3)). A year overrun on the original contract
delayed final completion until 1971. Despite the federal
subsidy, LCHC could only rehabilitate the apartments at a
cost of $17, 300 per unit. With the decision to rehab houses
under the Grass Roots program, costs per unit have been re-
duced by one third. LCHC has declined to use any federal
housing programs for the future. The only other funds re-
ceived from HUD have been a $278,000 three year grant cover-
ing salaries and on-the-job training of unskilled laborers in
the construction trades. At present, there are 130 tenants,
17 permanent crew members, and 30 salaried personnel. This
labor output has been tremendously expanded by over 75,000
volunteer man hours contributed since 1968.
The two- latest financial ventures incorporated into LCHC
.are the Paul Cuffee Federal Credit Union an.d,#LOH Mortgage
Corporation. The Credit Union was revived in 1970 by members
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of LCHC's staff to encourage regular savings among poor fa-
milies and to establish an important source of financial
credit for both the residents of the South End and the LCHC
tenants. LCH Mortgage Corporation is a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of LCHC, capitalized in 1971 in the amount of $250,
000. from assets pledged by the parent corporation. The
principal objective of the mortgage corporation is to aid
low-income families in becoming homeowners by extending long
term loans for home improvement or for construction finan-.
cing, with LCHC performing the work. Thus far, six mortgages
have been placed by the corporation.
Without a doubt, the motivation behind LCHC is the
dynamic duo of Rudy Waker and Bill Dukes. They are the
persons most responsible for conceiving and implementing
the Grass Roots program. Having worked together for over
seventeen years in the construction business, the two men
form an inspiring team with each complinenting the person-
ality of the other. Bill Dukes is "Mr. Inside," the super-
intendent, crew foreman, and the man responsible for the
completion of each rehabilitated unit. Rudy Waker, is
"Mr. Outside," the executive director, philosopher, and
keeper of the faith. It is he who best espouses the overall
philosophy of the Grass Ro.ots approach.
Bursting with ideas, Rudy compares Low Cost Housing to
a family, involving people -- poor folks. To improve their
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neighborhood, you have to put them to work, building up
their confidence by letting them know that they can always
get a job, learn a valuable skill, and make a tangible con-
tribution. Poor folks have pride and they have a right to
be somebody. Rudy's favorite aphorism is to "clean-up,
fix-up, and move-up." He constantly encourages the youth
to help pick up trash, a big problem in the inner city,
and asks them to p6lice their own neighborhoods. On Sa-
turdays, everybody participates in some manner by support-
ing a clean-up crew composed of volunteer tenants. As Rudy
states, "cleanliness has nothering to do with poverty."
Rudy is also a devotee of the non-profit concept. Poor
families cannot afford to take out a profit nor artificially
inflate the fruits of their labor (which explains in part
LCHC's policy for carrying their buildings and properties
at their book rate -- just acquisition and rehabilitation costs,
and not at the current market value.)
Evaluating their accomplishments, Waker and Dukes are
convinced that poor pcople (particularly Black folk) must
now begin laboring together to build their own shelter. It
is their obligation and responsibility to work cooperatively
to learn the intricacies of housing as a total process, and-
to. view themselves as the vehicle by which that process, and
i.ts product, becomes tailored to their personal needs and
expectations.
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LOW COST HOUSING CORPORATION (LCHC)
15 WORCESTER STREET
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02118
RUDY WAKER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
BILL DUKES, SUPERINTENDENT
Chronology
1967 LCHC is founded. Obtain a federal 221(d) (3) mortgage
subsidy to rehab 73 units
1968 Rudy Waker becomes Executive Director; begins institu-
ting Grass Roots program.
1970 Paul Cuffee Federal Credit Union -revived
LCHC contracts HUD training grant to instruct unskilled
laborers in the construction trades.
1971 LCH Mortgage Corporation is created as a wholly owned
subsidiary of LCHC.
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ROXBURY ACTION PROGRAM, INC. (RAP)
10 LINWOOD STREET
ROXBURY, MASSACHUSETTS 02119
GEORGE J. MORRISON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
The Roxbury Action Program, Inc. (RAP) is a Black di-
rected community-based organization located in the Highland
Park, Roxbury section of Boston, Mass. RAP is presently
structured as a non profit, tax-exempt corporation that is
committed to the comprehensive planning and control of the
Highland Park neighborhood. The area itself is a one-square
mile community of about 8,000 residents (predominantly low
and moderate income Black families) situated in a highly
accessible location with a topography that provides a view
1
overlooking downtown Boston.
Initially RAP was a spin-off from the American Friends
Service Committee (AFSC) , a Quaker organization that had a
branch office located in Roxbury during the middle sixties.
George Morrison, the Executive Director of RAP, who was
also with AFSC, stated that their resources then were fo-
cused on management-tenant relations, and of the attempts
to improve attitudes between landlords and tenants.
In July of 1969, RAP's staff moved directly into High-
land Park, equipped with a master plan and strategy for
making the area a "manageable model neighborhood." The ob-
jective was to implement a long-range program centered around
the basic need for shelter by applying leverage for control
of the land and housing supply within the neighborhood. RAP
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chose to enter into housing development as one facet of its
total package of community development for several reasons.
First, the organization's staff immediately saw the need to
upgrade Highland Park's grossly .inadequate housing stock,
and to augment the number of "decent, safe, and sanitary"
housing units in the area. Second, RAP wanted to be the ve-
hicle by which low and moderate income Black residents could
cooperatively own the neighborhood facilities if and when
they so desired. Third, the directors of RAP hoped to at-
tract various financial institutions of Boston into "ven-
tures of economic soundness" within Highland Park.2
RAP's present staff (all of whom must live in Highland
Park) consists of eleven professionals ranging from a hous-
ing manager to a pharmcist to a planning aide. The 1972-73
budget was set for $200,000, and includes six part-time pro-
3fessional workers. High on RAP's list of priorities is the
control of land uses in Highland Park. Since their arrival
in the nei-ghborhood, RAP has been involved in a gradual 'pro-
gram of property acquisition. At present, the community
group controls 44 residential and 2 commercial structures.
Current plans have been set for increased property ownership.
RAP-UP 1, their first rehab project (described in more de-.
tail below) has been successfully completed. RAP-UP II will
combine residential and comnerical rehabilitation along John
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Eliot Square in Highland Park. RAP-UP III and IV though
4formulated are still in the planning stages.
In 1970, RAP proceeded to acquire either through gifts
and purchases eleven buildings on six scattered sites in
the neighborhood, with the intention of rehabilitating the
33 apartments. RAP's inexperience and lack of technical
knowledge about development was decisively offset by the
100% ownership of the buildings and property, and by' its
5legitimate and recognizable community base. Originally,
RAP planned to enter into a joint venture for its first
attempt in housing development (RAP-UP I), but in-
stead, became the sole general partner in a limited divi-
dent limited partnership arrangement. Free technical assis-
tance was volunteered from various Greater Boston profes-
sional organizations. A prestigious downtown Boston law
firm donated its legal services by drawi-ng up the partner-
ship agreements and syndication of RAP's equity portion
(attracting high tax bracket investors into a limited part-
nership role for the purpose of purchasing ownership shares
in a development project in exchange for rights to the avail-
able "tax credits" of the project, i.e., depreciation, in-
terest payments, etc.). RAP also received the volunteer
services of a housing-financial consultant who worked close-
ly with the staff of RAP to- help them learn to put together
its financial package. Architectural and planning work was
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contributed by members of the Urban Field Service, an -af-
filiate of Harvard University's Graduate School of Design.
Financing was obtained from the Massachusetts Housing
Finance Agency, a state bonding authority which provides
construction loans and below market interest rate mortgages
exclusively for housing projects in Massachusetts. An agree-
ment was made with the Boston Housing Authority to lease
13 of the 33 units for those tenants who qualified for pub-
lic housing assistance (a direct rental supplement). Upon
final closing, RAP was able to convert its development to a
90" mortgage under Section 236. The federal subsidy lowered
interest rates to one percent and effectively reduced aver-
6age rents by approximately $40. per month.
RAP also realized a net profit of $25,000 through the
syndication of its equity investment. Had the group been
a proven developer with experience and capital, RAP could
have "oversold the equity," for a larger amount, and there-
by allowed its li-mited partner investors a higher return.
RAP also chose not to "write-up the land costs" (the
difference between acquisition costs and the market value
appraised for reimbursement by the mortgage proceeds) in
7
order to keep rents as low as possible.- Finally, RAP en.-
tered into a joint venture with a local minority builder
(who was based in Highland Park) as general contractor, and
split the 10% profit margin of the fixed cost construction
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contract, which netted RAP an additional $13,000. (4% pro-
fit on $325,000. construction cost). 8
The success of RAP-UP I produced many tangible resulcs
for the community-based group. First, the project increased
the financial assets of RAP and generated sorely needed in-
come. Secondly, the six months involving in completing the
financial arrangements for RAP-UP I was invaluable management
training for the staff. Thirdly, the development kicked off
a community-based development cycle that has enabled RAP
to roll over its seed capital for the packaging 6f several
new housing and commercial developments there in Highland
Park.
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ROXBURY ACTION PROGRAM (RAP)
10 LINWOOD STPEET
ROXBURY, MASS-CHUSETTS 02119
GEORGE J. MORRISON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
Chronology
1967 Roxbury branch of American Friends Service Committee
(AFSC) on 350-352 Blue Hill Avenue.
1969 RAP's staff moves out of AFSC to 63 Lambert Avenue in
the Highland Park neighborhood.
1970 RAP purchases their present office at 10 Linwood Street,
Hihgland Park.
1972 Rehabilitation of RAP-UP I completed and fully occupied.
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UNITED DURHAM, INC. (UDI)
P. O. BOX 1349
DURHAM, N.C. 27702
R. EDWARD STEWART, PRESIDENT
United Durham, Inc. (UDI) is a for-profit corporation
charted on 25 September 1968 by the State of North Carolina
as a local community industrial development corporation. Its
main purpose is to create successful businesses which will
offer products or services which provide the basic needs
such as food, shelter, clothing, medical care, etc. for
low income people in Durham, and Durham County. Thus far,
UDI has been one large scale economic and social experiment
to put poor people and their communities before corporate
profits.
UDI's purpose is to demonstrate that low income people,
especially Black people can engage in more competitive busi-
nesses than service stations, barber shops, shoeshine par-
lors, and the like. The target is to employ persons from the
low income communities of Durham in sound business ventures
that develop new skills, create more jobs, and generate added
capital to flow back into the poor communities. As the cycle
repeats itself with further job opportunities, new profi-
ciencies and more ownership, the overall well-being and eco-
nomic power of the community is enhanced.
Ea r1 y H istory
The idea for UDI grew out of the operation of some neigh-
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borhood buying clubs in 1968, when the United Organizations
for Community Improvement (UOCI) was providing members of
its twenty-one poor peoples' neighborhood councils with li-
mited amounts of canned goods, fresh produce, and other food
at reduced prices. The resulting savings on food helped the
neighborhood people in the buying club tremendously, and
many of them began talking about the idea of a supermarket
for poor people.
The talk began leading to action early in January 1968
when groups of low income Durham residents representing Oper-
ation Breakthrough, UOCI, and Project Outreach began meeting
with the Foundation for Community Development (FCD) . FCD
is a non-profit foundation which was formed in 1967 to pro-
vide support for community based development activities in
4North Carolina. Its founder and first director was a na-
tive of Durham's Black Community. The foundation was inter-
ested in using its business and financial skills to create
bus.iness ventures to be owned and operated by poor people
in Durham.. Consequently, the success of the buying clubs
in the low income communities, the growing interests of UOCI
to expand services to poor neighborhoods, and the economic
d.ovelopment strategy of FCD jelled around the idea of a super-
market serving Durham's low income communities.9
FCD incorporated the idea into a proposal submitted to
the Special Impact Office of the Office of Economic Oppor-
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tunity (OEO). The proposal was approved, and in April 1969, a grant
of $900,000 was awarded to FCD to start "a new community development
corporation, to be sponsored by FCD under the name of United Durham,
10In., and whose first venture was to be a community supermarket."
By the time of the first shareholder's meeting in February 1969,
the supermarket idea had expanded into that of a corporation which
would also spin-off other economic ventures. Therefore, the share-
holders established the following requirements for any new business
begun by the corporation:
1. UDI would be controlled by low income persons.
2. New ventures would be economically sound.
3. New ventures would hire local poor people primarily.
4. Each new venture would produce something poor people needed.
5. Portions of profits from any UDI venture would go back into
the low income neighborhood for uplift projects.
Structure of UDI
From the beginning, UDI was conceived and organi.:ed as an institu-
tion controlled directly by representatives of Durham's poor Black com-
munities. The by-laws call for a board of twenty-four directors, of
which two-thirds (16) are elected by holders of Class A stock. The re-
maining eight directors are chosen by Class B. holders. 1 2
"Class A stock is for sale exclusively to poor residents of the de-
fined target areas;" the 16 low income directorships must be elected,
1 3
as stipulated by the by-laws, from the U0C.I neighborhood councils.
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Class B shares, which are the first recipients of any
dividends declared by the board of directors, are sold to an
anyone or any-group. To ensure that the achievements and
payoffs of UDI are distributed among poor residents, Durham
Opportunities Foundation, Inc. (DOFI) , a non-profit "chari-
table trust," was specifically set up "as an entity through
which any funds obtained by UD.I, whether from OEO, local
corporations, or private foundations, could be channeled
through for the ultimate benefit of the community. The OEO
grants which constitute the largest source of funds to date
are thus treated as purchases of Class B stock, which are
turned over to DOFI." 1 4
To ensure the democratic operation of company matters
every shareholder, whether Class A or B, is limited to a
"one-man one-vote restriction. ,,15 In other words, no share-
holder has more than one vote when resolving UDI business
matters.
Total stock capitalization includes $1.8 million in OEO
grants and $43,000 raised locally. UDI currently employs
forty-five persons.
UDI Ventures
UDI Supermarket, a wholly owned venture of UDI, opened
for operations June 1971, as an independent supermarket oc-
cupying 6,336 so.. ft: of space, and offering approximately
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4,600 items in retail food and food related business. The
store operates on a seven day a week basis, and employs seven
full-time and four part-time persons. The supermarket dis-
plays most national brand names plus those 6f its own local
wholesale supplier. Moreover, the'market features competi-
tive prices to the general public and a 2% discount at the
cash register to holders of Class A (low income, common, and
16
voting) stock in UDI.
"In general, construction, plumbing, and electrical work
on the supermarket was handled by minority owned contracting
firms. The business was financed through the sale of approx-
imately $40,000 of stock, and a $40,000 venture capital grant
from OEO Title l-D Special Impact Funds. A $65,000 interim
construction loan was advanced from Mechanics & Farmers Bank
based uppn a $76,000 permanent mortgage from North Carolina
Mutual Life Insurance Company. A SBA guaranteed equipment
and working capital loan was also placed through Mechanics
and- Farmers Bank. Total start-up costs (including land,
building and parking, equipment costs and inventory) was
$220,900.
After a year and a half of operations, UDI supermarket
is still grossing weekly sales below the necessary break-
even point.
Modular 1Iome Plant (Tech Homes Division)
The Tech Homes Division of UDI was begun in November
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1970. Three objectives were set down as guidelines for the.
modular home plant operations:18 1) profit; 2) production
of quality low cost houses for purchase by families of limi-
ted income; 3) job development. A 8,800 sq. ft. warehouse
was leased as a temporary plant; actual production commenced
in December. All employees were selected from Durham's
target areas.
Tech Home's modular house was conceived as being made-
up of several sectionals if standardized parts (12' x 40')
which are factory built on an assembly line. The sectionals
are then transported to a pre-prepared site where they are
then fastened together.
The first modular house was completed in February of
1971, erected the following month, and exhibited as a Demon-
stration Home. The unit was later enlarged and converted
into the staff office for UDI.
The modular home consisted of wood frame construction
with exposed and sloping ceiling beams and deck roof. The
exterior was covered with painted rough sawn plywood siding.
Other finishes and materials included asphalt, self seal
roof shingles, vertical sliding aluminum windows (with screens),
wood doors, one fourth (1/4) inch plywood paneling-and one
half (1/2) inch gypsum board. Square footage varied from
960 to 1, 284 sq. ft. depending -upon three or four bedrooms,
and one or one and a half bathrooms. Standard items inclu-
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ded a one-piece molded fiberglass tub-shower, electric ba:se-
board heating, wall to wall nylon carpeting, prefinished ki-
tchen cabinets, a twelve cubic foot refrigerator, thirty-inch
electric range, and a forty-two gallon hot water heater. As-
sembly time, when in full production, for one house from
start to finish was scheduled for five days (one work week).
By the end of 1971, twelve homes had been constructed,
but only ten have been erected and sold in Durham and sur-
rounding areas. FHA appraisal for the unit varied depend-
ing upon location, from $17,000 - $18,000. A break even
rate of production had been set at one house per week using
only one shift; however, factory output was unable to meet
such a schedule.
A consultant from Boise Cascade Corp. was called in to
help with the lagging production output. His estimate was
that the plant's maximum capacity output on a one shift basis
was two houses per week. He further recommended revisions
in color, materials, site preparation and the delegation of
full-time responsibilities for marketing and sales.
Tech homes' problems of production control and the sche-
duling and finishing of units more efficiently nonetheless
continued. A s.pecial study was conducted, and its findings
reported in the spring of 1972. The study highlighted the
slow work pace and under-utilization of manpower; moreover,
it was suggested that design features and workmanship had
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to be improved. The following inefficiencies were revealed:2 0
The first model utilized many non-standard
components and sizes, overlooking some of the
more basic cost saving materials on the mar-
ket today. For example, stud sizes for the
wall frames were not standard, nor were many
window openings. Specifications also neg-
lected such labor saving items as pre-hung
door frames and prestained exterior siding.
The sloping cathedral ceiling of each sec-
tional was simply expensive to build.
Finally UDI's policy of on-the-job training and employment
of target area residents was proving to be a costly endea-
vor which the corporation had to absorb. UDI's special ef-
forts, the amount and length of time involved, plus the added
expense of providing such extra instruction, had resulted in
lost labor hours, wasted materials, and high production costs
for each unit built in the factory.
By the end of the summer, with the Tech Division losing
approximately $2,000 per house, UDI decided to go with a new
model design. Production costs on the first design had soared
above its appraised market value. In addition, low-income
consumer acceptance of brick exterior as a symbol of quality
construction did not favor the plywood siding. In November
1972, the plant was closed down to switch-over to the new
model. The number of employees in the plant was cut to a
low of ten (from an original high of thirty including the
plant manager).
Sales during 1972 included six units bought by Duke Uni-
versity, five units for 'the Low Income Housing Development
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Corp. in North Carolina, and four shipped to Spellman College
in Atlanta, Georgia, to be used as a day care facility.
The second model designated Design 1000 came off the
assembly line in February of 1973. The new model differed
substantially from the first. The two adjoining sectionals
are now completely enclosed in a rectangular layout (before
they were offset) . Design 1000 is built to receive brick ve-
neer, masonite siding, or regular brick and siding. The stan-
dard interior finish materials are paneling with sprayed
textured ceilings. The floor plan offers three bedrooms only,
but has the option of an additional half-bath. Standard items
are as before in the first model except for the vinyl covered
(washable) plywood now used in the bathroom. Optimal assem-
bly time when in full production is slated for about four
21days.
Six units of the new model have already been built, and
four have been erected and sold. UDI has assembled on one
side of a city street in a new development seven of its
modular homes, including one model unit of the new Design
1000. Additionally, an agreement has been worked out with
a local developer who is building in the Black community to
place four of the new units in his latest development. The
running total for both models manufacured by Tech Homes thus
far (March, 1973) is forty homes built, and -thirty-two sold.
Future plans in the works are a twenty-six acre (the
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land has been purchased) industrial park to house UDI's per-
manent modular factory, warehouse and food processing activ-
ities. A ten acre, 36 unit residential section is also plan-
ned within the park.
UDI has just recently optioned four and a half acres in
the rapidly growing southern secticn of Durham with the in-
tentions of building a convenience shopping center anchored
around their second UDI Supermarket. The corporation is present-
ly in the preliminary stages of architectural schematics and financial
packaging of the deal.
In the past two years, since the selection of its first
full time president, UDI has learned that maintaining commun-
ity involvement and communication calls for a continuing
effort. Its slogan of "people before profits" is proving to be
an objective difficult to approximate when it is simultane-
ously engrossed in. building a viable economic institution as
well as fostering sustained and vigilant input from Low-income
residents and stockholders of Durham. But the dual commit-
ment, nevertheless, of coupling social responsibility,
community awareness and . organizational procedures with a hard-
nosed business-mindedness appears to be, embedded An the as-
Firations of the owners and managers of UDI.Fortunately though,
the corporation was begun with a solid foundation, and hope-
fully, it will be able to grow upon the ongoing and indigen-
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ous UOCI, the sophistication of FCD, and the support and
cooperation of Durham's business, professional, and low-
income community.
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UNITED DURHAM, INC. (UDI)
P.O. BOX 1349
DURHAM, N.C. 27702
R. EDWARD STEWART, PRESIDENT
Chronology
1967 Foundation for Community Development (FCD) established.
1968 United Organizations for Community Improvement (UOCI) organizes
neighborhood buying clubs.
UDI is incorporated as a local community industrial development
corporation.
1969 FCD submits proposal to OEO for funding of a new Community De-
velopment Corporation to sponsor a supermarket.
First shareholders meeting of UDI.
Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) approves grant for eventual
funding of $1.8 million to UDI.
1970 Tech Homes Division, plans started for a modular housing factory.
1971 UDI Supermarket opened for operations.
First modular house completed as a demonstration model.
1972 Tech Homes switches to a second model -- Design 1000.
1973 New model is assembled on the site.
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COMMUNITY BASED DEVELOPERS
REFERENCES
LCHC
Resources for the case were:
Interviews with Rudy Waker and Bill Dukes, 8 February, 17 February,
and 8 March 1973.
LCHC brochures
The Annual Report 1971, Low Cost Housing Corporation
"Non Profit Group Rehabilitates South End Houses, Set Low Rents,"
Boston Herald Traveler 1 August 1971.
Jeannye Thornton, "Boston Volunteers Make Good On Low Cost Housing
Conversion," Christian Science Monitor, 12 February 1973.
RAP
An interview was conducted with Executive Director, George J. Morrison, 22
February 1973.
UDI
Primary sources of information included in the text were compiled from:
Interviews with Edward Stewart President, and James W. Brown,
Jr., Marketing Director, 19 March 1973. With Nathan Garret, former direc-
tor of FCD, and one of the first incorporators of UDI, 20 March 1973.
Company brochures.
UDI Newsletter January 1973.
Company files on the Board of Directors meetings, and the Tech
Homes Division Committ-ee meetings. 1969-72.
FOOTNOTES
1. James Morey and Mel Epstein, Housing Development: A Tool for Com-
munity Economic Development in Low Income Areas, (Cambridge, Mass., Cen-
ter for Community Economic Development, 1971), p. 25
2. George Morrison, "Roxbury Action Program, Inc. Three Years Later,"
(A corporation report, January 1973), pp. 4-5.,
-161-
3. Ibid., pp. 1-2.
4. Ibid., p. 9.
5. Morey and Epstein, Housing Development, p. 7. Read prerequisities
for Community Groups to become Developers p. 7-10. Summarizing they are
(1) a legitimate and well-defined community base, (2) technical exper-
tise concerning housing development, (3) access to sources of financing.
6. Ibid., pp. 26-27.
7. Ibid., p. 29.
8. Ibid., p. 27.
9. Barry Stein, United Durham, Inc.: A Case Study in Community Control,
(Cambr'idge, Mass., Center for Community Economic Development, 1972),
p. 4.
10. Stein, United Durham, p. 4.
11. Company brochure, p. 2.
12. Stein, United Durham, p. 5.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Report of UDI Activities, Quarterly Report to OEO; Oct. 1 - Dec.
31, 1972.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Fact Sheet on United Durham, Inc's. Modular House. UDI Modular
Plant Specifications. June 1971.
120. Marshal Kaplan, Gans & Kahn, "Report on Tech Homes," (Written by
Andrew Syrkin) May 1972.
21. De.sign 1000 Brochure.
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